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I. INTRODUCTION
War, revolution, and ethnic hatred have long wreaked havoc on the
nationality of individuals. Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy,
and post-WWII Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Japan all
passed legislation expressly denationalizing large segments of their
populations.' More recently, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia,' and
Mauritania have implemented ethnically-based expulsion programs that
in effect functioned as denationalization programs.
I P. WEIS, NATIONALII' AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 119-20
(1979) [hereinafter WEiS] (discussing denationalization of opponents of the Bolshevik
regime in Russia: Jews in Germany and Italy ethnic Germans and Hungarians in
Czechoslovakia and ethnic Germans in Poland and Yugoslavia): JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACICE 89 (1995)
(discussing mass denationalization of ethnic Koreans in Japan).
2 Full disclosure: I have done work on behalf of the State of Eritrea in two cases
currently pending before the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. One of these
cases involves the denationalization and expulsion of ethnic Eritreans from Ethiopia.
3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "ILLEGAL PEOPLE": HAITIANS AND DOMINICO-
HAIIJANS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2002) [hereinafter ILLEGAL PEOPLE]
(discussing denationalizationlexpulsion of ethnic Haitians from the Dominican
Republic): HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE HORN OF AFRICA WAR: MASS EXPULSIONS
AND THE NATIONALITY ISSUE (JUNE 1998 1O APRIL 2002) 18-31 (2003) [hereinafter
THE HORN OF AFRICA WAR] (discussing denationalization/expulsion of ethnic
Eritreans from Ethiopia) HENCKAERTS, supra note 1, at 81-82 (discussing
denationalization/expulsion of ethnic Senegalese from Mauritania). Perhaps less
formally, it seems that a similar program expelling ethnic Nepalese has taken place in
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Of course, numerous international instruments purport to limit the
ability of states to deprive individuals of their nationality. However,
Bhutan. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NA-IONALITY, EXPLILSION, STATELESSNESS,
AND THE RIoHT TO RETURN 4 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, August 30, 1961, art.
8(1), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9/15 (except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article,
"A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation
would render him stateless."): id. art. 8(4) ("A Contracting State shall not exercise a
power of deprivation permitted by paragraphs 2 or 3 of this article except in
accordance with law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair
hearing by a court or other independent body."): id. art. 9 ("A Contracting State may
not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic,
religious or political grounds."); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art 5(d)(iii), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 ("In
compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention,
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of..
[t]he right to nationality."): American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 20(3), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] ("No one shall he
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it."): Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, art. 9,
G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 ("States
Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain a
nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the
husband."); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
art 12(2), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 ("Every individual shall have the right to
leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only
be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security.
law and order, public health or morality."): European Convention on Nationalit.
1997, art. 4. 37 I.L.M 44 (listing under "principles" that "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his or her nationality."): id. art. 7(1) ("A State Party may not provide in
its internal law for the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the initiative of the State
Party except [listing seven cases where this is permissible. including voluntary
acquisition of another nationality, acquisition of the nationality of the state party by
fraud, foreign military service, conduct prejudicial to the vital interest of the state,
lack of a genuine link to the state in the case of a national living abroad, and certain
circumstances relating to minor children]"): id. art. 8(1) ("Each State Party shall
permit the renunciation of its nationality provided the persons concerned do not
thereby become stateless."): id. art 8(2) ("However, a State Party may provide in its
internal law that renunciation may be effected only by nationals who are habitually
resident abroad."). See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15(1), G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has
right to a nationality.") id. art. 15(2) ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."): American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, art. 19, O.A.S. Res. XXX
("Every person has the right to the nationality to which he is entitled by law and to
change it, if he so wishes, for the nationality of any other country that is willing to
grant it to him."): Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and
University of California, Davis [Vol. 10:301
with the exception of the European Convention on Nationality, these
instruments either consist of "soft law"' or are of limited factual
applications." Noting this, scholars have attempted to prove the
existence of general rules of international law prohibiting
denationalization, either in all cases or in particular circumstances.7
Unfortunately for those who favor a norm against denationalization,
these efforts have met with only limited success.'
Fundamental Freedoms, Sep. 16, 1963, art. 3(1), E.T.S No. 46 ("No one shall be
expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the
territory of which he is a national."), id. art. 3(2) ("No one shall be deprived of the
right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national."); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 12(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
("[N]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.").
5 The term "soft law" has now acquired a number of different meanings, and I
include in this category three distinct types of legal provisions. First, I include
provisions that by their own terms are not intended to contain enforceable
obligations. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4. Second,
I include provisions which seem at first to include a solid proposition of law, but in
fact contain exceptions so extensive as to risk vitiating the right purportedly
guaranteed. See, e.g., African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra
note 4, art 12(2). Third, I include provisions with weak enforcement mechanisms.
See, e g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 4(2), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302. All three categories should be contrasted with
"hard" international law, by which I simply mean those treaty provisions, custom,
general principles of law, or series' of authoritative and controlling decisions, which
are generally accepted as binding by relevant international actors. See infra notes 90-
Q4 and accompanying text. Although not an absolute rule, it is probably fair to
suggest that law governing interstate relations (i.e., law pertaining to trade and
extradition) is generally "harder" than law purporting to govern they way that states
behave within their own territories (i.e., law pertaining to protection of the
environment and human rights).
On the varying conceptions of soft law, see Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Noroiat'ivI
, 
ili International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983); Gunther F. Handle et
al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc' INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988); Francesco
Francioni, International 'soft law': a contenporary assessment, in FiFTY YEARS OF THE
INI iERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 167
(Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice cd , 1996) [hereinafter FIFTY YEARS OF
THE ICJ]; Alan Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law,
in MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING: THE CURRENT STATUS OF CHALLENGES TO
AND REFORMS NEEDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2000).
6 For example, certain provisions apply only in the case of denationalizations
creating statelessness, or denationalizations for overtly discriminatory reasons.
7 WEts, supra note 1, at 123-24 (discussing efforts of other authors).
8 Id. at 125 ("With [the possible exception of a prohibition on discriminatory
denationalization], the views of those who regard denationalization or, at least,
denationalization for penal or political reasons as inconsistent with the law of nations,
find no justification in the present state of international law.").
2004] Passports and Nationality in International Law 305
This Article proposes an alternate means by which to limit the
ability of states to denationalize their own citizens.' At least in the case
of passport holders, a well -established body of "hard" international
law'"-what I term the law of binding state action-limits state authority
more effectively than human rights norms of controversial status. The
act of issuing a passport is the key event triggering the application of this
body of law.
Below, Part II offers a framework for analyzing the proof of
nationality problem. I outline three contexts-or types of international
claims-in which it can be necessary to prove an individual's nationality
under international law: diplomatic protection, substantive eligibility,
and denationalization. The first two contexts arose frequently in
traditional international disputes, and the law regarding proof of
nationality in those areas is correspondingly well developed. By contrast,
in the third context, the requirements for proof of nationality have rarely
been addressed. It is this denationalization context, where an individual
has a claim against a state expressly because it was once the state of his
or her nationality, that the remainder of this Article addresses.
In international adjudication, proof of nationality is complicated by
the differences between international and domestic nationality law. Part
III examines the relationship between these bodies of law, with
particular emphasis on the variations that arise when one state, multiple
states, or no state claims a person as its national. It is the third
variation-where no state claims a person as its national that is most
relevant to proof of nationality in the denationalization context.
Part IV turns to the passport, a document with special relevance to
the proof of nationality problem. The passport has developed from a
somewhat ad-hoc letter addressed to foreign powers into a sophisticated,
formalized document attesting to both the identity and nationality of its
Although I approach this problem primarily from the perspective of the cX-post
litigation, the principles discussed in this Article can also be applied in both settlement
negotiations and ev-ante efforts to prevent denationalization. Few parties will be
willing to settle an international dispute-particularly states accused of distasteful act'
such as denationalization unless they believe that they have an accurate
understanding of their rights and liabilities in the litigation context. Similarly, an
understanding of the proper application of the law of binding state action to passport
holders may help to deter states from denationalizing individuals.
Of course, this last assertion is open to the criticism that the approach presented in
this Article would not in fact prevent states from denationalizing their passport-
holding citizens, but would simply encourage them to undertake the necessary public
notification efforts before doing so. However, I suggest that the negative publicity
and international pressure that would result from a requirement that
denationalization of passport holders be done more "openly" might in itself serve as a
substantial deterrence to such efforts.
10 On the distinction between hard and soft law, see supra note 5.
University of California, Davis
bearer. Although early passports were not always accepted as proof of
nationality, even under the law of the issuing state, the modern passport
is now widely accepted as proof of nationality under domestic law.
Moreover, at least one major international tribunal has accepted the
passport as near-conclusive evidence of domestic law nationality.
Part V presents the main normative claim of this Article: that a
passport-issuing state should be prevented from denying that the holder
of a valid passport is in fact a national of that state. Support for this
proposition can be found in the law of binding state action, a set of
related legal principles by which a state's past actions have been held to
be enforceable against that state in the future. Although existing
applications of this body of law have primarily involved boundary
disputes and high diplomacy, it may be even more appropriate to apply
these principles to the relatively mundane issue of passports and
nationality.
Part VI sets out three exceptions to Part V's normative claim. The
issuing state should not be prevented by the law of binding state action
from denying the passport holder's nationality in situations where the
individual in question has obtained a passport through fraud, in
situations where the individual in question has lost the nationality of the
issuing state, and in certain cases involving dual nationality.
Part VII addresses international procedure. Although standing
requirements have historically operated to prevent denationalized
individuals from asserting claims, some factual permutations and some
newer fora may now make such claims possible. Once a claim is
asserted, the burden to prove the applicability of the exceptions
discussed in Part VI should be on the issuing state rather than the
passport holder. Once the claim is established, remedies should involve
monetary compensation rather than orders to treat a particular passport
holder as a national.
Part VIII concludes, addressing two main types of denationalization
and attempting to set the issues addressed here in a broader context. In
the case of denationalization by operation of law, shifts in state control
over territory can have unintended effects on the nationality of
individuals. In the case of discriminatory denationalization, fully
intentional efforts are made to denationalize politically unpopular
groups. In both cases, a proper application of the law of binding state
action can provide substantial protection to passport-holding
individuals."
11 Before moving to Part II, three definitions are in order. Throughout this
Article, I use the term "nationality" in a strictly formal sense, as denoting an
individual's "quality of being a subject of a certain state." OPPENHEiM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 378 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
[Vol. 10:301
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II. THE NEED TO PROVE NATIONALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The ability to enforce international limitations on state power to
denationalize is closely tied to the evidentiary question of how to prove
nationality before a court or international tribunal. This is because it is
necessary to establish that an individual is, or was, a national of a
particular state in order to apply such a substantive norm. This Article
will thus focus on two main topics: the proof of nationality problem,
which will be addressed in Parts II through IV; and the effect of the law
of binding state action on denationalization of passport holders, which
will be addressed in Part V.
In this Part, I set out three specific contexts in which it may be
important to prove the nationality of an individual under international
law."' First, a state may need to prove that an individual has its
1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEII]. Such a formal definition is useful from a legal
perspective, because it permits a focus on the rights and privileges associated with
such formal nationality. Similarly, I use the term "denationalization" to refer to the
process by which a state formally strips an individual of his or her legal nationality,
even though that individual may still share a culture and sense of shared identity with
other members of the national group.
A third definition-that of the term "state"-is more problematic. For present
purposes, I adopt the definition set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. See
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1. 49
Stat. 3097 ("The state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: a) a permanent population b) a defined territory: c) government and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."). Although this definition
has been criticized, see Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention of 1933 and its Discontents, 37 COLUNi. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 434-439
(1999) (summarizing criticisms), it is perhaps the most commonly cited definition and
is sufficient for purposes of this Article. See id. at 414-415.
Finally, it is worth recognizing that at least two of these terms-nationality and
state-are significant not only in law but also in other academic disciplines. In
particular, they have come to play an important role in political science and related
fields. Without engaging in terminological debate or making any effort to be
comprehensive, a list of important works addressing these concepts might include the
following: Robert Cooper, The post-modern state and the world order 15-20, 31-33
(2000), http://www.demos.co.uk/catalogue/thepostmodernstate-page83.aspx. (setting
out three stages of state development): ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM 3-6, 53-62 (1983) (discussing the ideas of state, nation, and nationality)
ANTHONY D.S. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1-13 (1979)
(discussing the development of the "national ideal"): HEDLEY BULL, THE
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8-9 (1977) (defining
"state"): MAX WEBER, EcONOMY AND SOCIETY 54-56 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., University of California Press 1968) (1922) (same).
12 The nationality of an individual under international law may be different from
his or her nationality under domestic law. For example, an individual may qualify as a
national of two or more different states under those states domestic law, but under
international law only one of those nationalities can be "dominant and effective" at a
particular time. See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (Second
University of California, Davis
nationality in order to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of that
particular individual. Second, proof of an individual's nationality may be
necessary in order to show that the tribunal may entertain a claim by or
on behalf of that individual against some common fund. Third, the
nationality of a particular individual may be relevant to the merits of a
denationalization3 claim.
This third context will be the primary concern of this Article. As the
discussion below will demonstrate, the structure of international
adjudication has rarely given parties the opportunity to prove nationality
in an adversary proceeding against the state of which the litigant claims
to be a national. It is a project of this Article to set out one way that such
proof can be established.
A. Diplomatic Protection
The diplomatic protection context involves the exercise of a
substantive right one state has against another state with regard to some
action taken by the defendant state against an individual." This is the
problem of "diplomatic protection," that is, the standing of one state to
represent a particular person before an international tribunal. In
general, states may only exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of their
nationals." For example, the claim of an individual can only be brought
Phase) Case No. A118, Decision No. 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 251.
13 It is worth noting that a denationalization claim will frequently be tied to
another claim for unlawful expulsion of nationals. However, for simplicity, I use the
term "denationalization claim" to include both claims for denationalization alone (i.e.,
when the decision is made while the individual is outside of the state of (former)
nationality) and claims where a successful denationalization claim is prerequisite to a
successful expulsion claim (i.e., when an expulsion that has taken place will be
unlawful only if it can be established that the individuals in question were unlawfully
denationalized prior to or at the time of expulsion).
14 Because injury to individuals does not traditionally give rise to state
responsibility, a sort of fiction is established whereby an injury to an individual is
treated as an injury to the state of his or her nationality. See IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 482 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
BROWNLIE 1998] ("A normal and important function of nationality is to establish the
legal interest of a state when nationals, and legal persons with a sufficient connection
with the state, receive injury or loss at the hands of another state. The subject-matter
of the claim is the individual and his property: the claim is that of the state. Thus, if
the plaintiff state cannot establish the nationality of the claim, the claim is
inadmissible because of the absence of any legal interest of the claimant.") (citations
omitted).
15 See Flegenheimer Claim (U.S. v. Italy), 25 I.L.R. 91, 157 (Italy-U.S. Conciliation
Comm'n 1958) (noting that a particular treaty provision "is a rule of an exceptional
character, in that it extends the diplomatic protection of the United Nations to
persons who are not their nationals: like every exception, it must be interpreted in a
restrictive sense, because it deviates from the general rules of the Law of Nations on
[Vol. 10:301
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before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by a state of the
individual's nationality.'6 Thus, it can be necessary to prove nationality
anytime State A attempts to exercise diplomatic protection over a person
in State B, but State B does not want to recognize that the person in
question is a national of State A."
B. Eligibility to Make a Claim
This second context occurs when a treaty gives individuals of some
particular nationality a substantive right-either against a state or to
compensation from some common fund. For example, post-war claims
tribunals often have their jurisdiction limited to claims by individuals of a
particular nationality or set of nationalities. One well-known example is
the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission. Article 78 of Treaty
of Peace with Italy of 1947, which established the Commission, limited
the jurisdiction of the tribunal-in essence, access to a pool of money
to those who were nationals of any U.N. member state during the
relevant time period." These tribunals typically are established by a
politically influential state or group of states during a post-conflict
period. Jurisdiction is limited to nationals of the particular state or group
this point"): BROWNLIE 1998, supra note 14, at 406: 1 MARJORIE M. WIIIIMAN,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1937). One important exception to this rule is
that a treaty or other agreement between states may provide for the protection of
non-nationals in a particular context. BROXNLIE 1998, supra, at 482. See also infra
Part VII.A.
16 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34(l), 59
Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] ("Only states may be parties in cases betorc the
court."). Nottebohrn Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 13, 26 (noting that states are entitled to
exercise diplomatic protection-and thus submit claims to the I.C.J-only on behalf
of their nationals).
17 See, e.g., Nottebohi Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 12-13, 20.
18 The article reads as follows:
The Italian Government shall invalidate transfers involving property,
rights and interests of any description belonging to United Nations
Nationals, where such transfers resulted from force or duress exerted by
Axis Governments or their agencies during the war.
"United Nations Nationals'" means individuals who are nationals of any
of the United nations, or corporations or associations organized under
the laws of any of the United Nations, at the coming into force of the
present Treaty, provided that the said individuals, corporations or
associations also had this status on September 3, 1943, the date of the
Armistice with Italy.
The term "United Nations Nationals" also includes all individuals,
corporations or associations which, under the laws in force in Italy
during the war, have been treated as enemy.
Flegenheimer Clain', 25 I.L.R. at 97 (quoting Treaty of Peace with Italy of 1947).
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of states, in order to put some limit on the number of claims a state will
have to pay and to prevent the tribunal from hearing claims against a
state by its own nationals.
C. Denationalization
The third context occurs in the special case of denationalization,
where an individual has a substantive right against the state of his or her
nationality.' In order to prove denationalization, however, it is
necessary first to prove that the individual once had the nationality of the
issuing state. In the two contexts discussed above-diplomatic immunity
and eligibility to make a claim-the law regarding proof of nationality is
relatively well developed and noncontroversial. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said for proof of nationality in the denationalization context.
First, the language of many of these limitations is stronger than their
practical effect. Broadly-phrased international declarations give way to
more narrow language in actual legal instruments. For example, the non-
binding Universal Declaration on Human Rights declares that "No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality."2 ' Binding legal documents, however, make more
limited guarantees: the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness prevents state-parties from denationalizing persons who
would thereby become stateless, but allows for certain exceptions to this
19 It has long been recognized that states have a general right o determine issues
of nationality under their own domestic law. See, e.g., Convention Concerning
Certain Questions Related to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, April 12, 1930, art. 1,
179 L.N.T-S. 89 [hereinafter 1930 Hague Convention] ("It is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals.") Advisory Opinion Concerning
the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, PCIJ, (ser. B) No. 4 (1923) ("The
question whether a certain matter or not is wholly within the jurisdiction of a State is
an essentially relative question it depends upon the development of [international]
relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are,
in the opinion of this Court, in principle within this reserved domain."); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-84 (4th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter BROWNLIE 1990] (explaining that the standard construction of the Tunis
and Morocco Nationality Decrees opinion is that "states are exclusively in control of
nationality matters"). However, at least for purposes of international law, the scope
of this right is not unlimited. Because the relation of nationality between an
individual and a state can affect the rights of other states, as well as the rights of the
individual involved, international law has long placed some limits on a state action in
this area. See, e.g., 1930 Hague Convention, supra, art. 1 ("It is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international
custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.")
(emphasis added). On the inherent tension in article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention,
see BROWNLIE 1990, supra at 386.
20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4, art 15(2).
[Vol. 10:301
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general rule. 1 In regard to persons who would not become stateless, the
Convention simply provides that they may not be denationalized "on
racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds."" The International
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is even
narrower-it merely requires that the "right to nationality" not be
denied for discriminatory reasons.21 The Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women mandates only that
women be granted equal rights with men in regard to nationality and not
be forced to change nationality by marriage or a change in a husband's
nationality." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
does not directly discuss nationality, but provides that "[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."''
The jurisprudence of nationality in human rights law is also
underdeveloped for a second reason. Most of these "soft law" provisions
lack regular enforcement mechanisms. In fact, as will be discussed
further below, the structure of international adjudication makes it very
difficult to enforce international norms governing the relationship
between an individual and the state of his or her nationality.
Controversies over diplomatic protection and substantive eligibility are
routinely adjudicated as procedural prerequisites to litigation over other,
substantive claims. But, as we will see, there is no commonly available
procedural vehicle for lodging complaints against one's own state when
one has been denationalized. The end result is that international treaties
promise more than they deliver, and, in practice, international law has
not served as an effective limit on state prerogative in this area.
Yet, this should not detract from the importance of limitations on
state power to denationalize as a matter of substantive international law.
The sheer number of treaties, declarations, and publications touching on
nationality testify to the strong interest in this area by, at the very least, a
small but influential minority. Moreover, in certain cases, a forum may
21 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 4, art. 8(1) (except as
provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, '[a] Contracting State shall not deprive
a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless"). When
exercising its right under one of these exceptions to denationalize individuals who
would thus become stateless, a state-party must provide some basic degree of due
process or non-arbitrariness. Id. art. 8(4) ("A Contracting State shall not exercise a
power of deprivation permitted by paragraphs 2 or 3 of this article except in
accordance with law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair
hearing by a court or other independent body.").
22 Id. art. 9.
23 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 4, art 5(d)(iii).
24 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, supra note 4, art. 9.
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 12(4).
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already exist in which individuals who claim to have been deprived of
nationality may bring a claim against their own state.26 Given the general
26 There are three permanent international fora that may be able to hear a
deprivation of nationality claim. Additionally, there is at least on ad hoc international
tribunal that should have jurisdiction over such claims.
Perhaps most important of the permanent fora is the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. Although the Court does not receive petitions from individuals, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has the power to do so under Article 23 of
its statute. If, after hearing the petition and issuing a report, the Commission
discovers that the relevant state has not complied with its recommendations, the
Commission is required to refer cases to the Court in the absence of an absolute
majority vote not to do so. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, art. 44(1), http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basicl6.htm ("If the State
in question has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in accordance
with Article 62 of the American Convention, and the Commission considers that the
State has not complied with the recommendations of the report approved in
accordance with Article 50 of the American Convention, it shall refer the case to the
Court, unless there is a reasoned decision by an absolute majority of the members of
the Commission to the contrary."). Through this procedure, it should be possible for
an individual to bring a claim against a state that has arbitrarily deprived him of its
nationality. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art 20(3).
A second forum that deserves mention due to its general institutional success is the
European Court of Human Rights. Despite its relative success in forcing states to
respect human rights norms in other areas, this forum is probably less important here
because substantive European human rights law is less favorable to deprivation of
nationality claims than substantive Inter-American human rights law. Protocol 4 to
the European Convention prohibits expulsion of nationals and deprivation of the
right of a person to enter the country of his nationality. Protocol No. 4 to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sep. 16, 1963,
art. 3(1) ("No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a
collective measure, from the territory of which he is a national.") id. art. 3(2) ("No
one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a
national."). Unfortunately, as one former member of the European Commission has
argued, "[t]here is no guarantee that a State may not also in [the] future follow the
well-known pattern in the history of dictatorships of depriving undesirable nationals
of their citizenship and then expelling them as foreigners." RUTH DONNER, THE
REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (1994) (quoting
Castberg, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 185 (1974)). This
argument is buttressed by the observation that:
[I]t appears evident from the Explanatory Reports that the Committee
of Experts rejected a proposal to include in Article 3 of Protocol 4 a
provision according to which "a State would be forbidden to deprive a
national of his nationality for the purpose of expelling him," because the
majority thought "it was inadmissible in Article 3 to touch on the
delicate question of the legitimacy of measures depriving individuals of
nationality."
DONNER, supra at 227. See also P. VAN DiJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 367-75 (1984).
However, it is worth noting that even in the case that a state did follow this unsavory
path, a deprivation of nationality claim could force it to take the action more openly.
Such a test case, even if unsuccessful on the law, could have the salutary effect of
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trend toward the establishment of courts and international tribunals with
jurisdiction over human rights claims,27 it does not seem unlikely that
bringing political pressure on a state that wished to quietly denationalize and then
expel an individual or group.
Finally, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights also has an individual complaint procedure. Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, art. 2
("[Ilndividuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have
been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a
written communication to the Committee for consideration."). This is the least useful
of these three potential fora, because neither the relevant substantive law nor the
remedy available is particularly strong. As noted above, the Covenant prohibits
"arbitrary" deprivation of "the right to enter [one's] own country," but does not
explicitly mention deprivation of nationality. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 12(4). As a remedy, the Commission is instructed to
bring complaints submitted to it to the attention of the responsible state. Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, art.
4(1) ("[T]he Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it under the
present Protocol to the Attention of the State Party to the present Protocol alleged to
be violating any provision of the Covenant.' There is then a very soft legal
requirement that "[w]ithin six months, the receiving State shall submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifYing the matter and the remedy, if
any, that ma' have been taken by that State." Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added). The
procedure is thus useful for documenting violations of the Covenant and bringing
political pressure to bear on the responsible state, but it does not provide a means to
remedy the harm that the individual has suffered.
In addition to these permanent fora, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is of
particular interest. Article 5(9) of the December 12, 2000, Agreement between the
Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the
State of Eritrea [hereinafter December 12 Agreement] provides that:
In appropriate cases, each party may file claims on behalf of persons of
Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such claims
shall be considered by the Commission on the same basis as claims
submitted on behalf of that party's nationals.
December 12 Agreement, art. 5(9). The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction
over claims related to the 1998-2000 conflict between the two state-parties that "result
from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, or other violations of international law." Id. art. 5(1). Combined, these
two provisions allow the commission to hear both (1) deprivation of nationality claims
brought against Eritrea by persons of Ethiopian origin; and (2) deprivation of
nationality claims brought against Ethiopia by persons of Eritrean origin. Moreover,
given the driving role of ethnicity in recent refugee -producing conflicts, it does not
seem improbable that similar provisions could be included in future peace
agreements.
27 The second half of the Twentieth Century saw the establishment of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
UN Human Rights Commission, and African Commission on Human Rights.
Perhaps more importantly, the European and Inter-American courts have increased
substantially in power and authority in the decades after their establishment.
Additional support for the trend toward internationalization of individual rights-
from a different perspective-can be found in the various international criminal
University of California, Davis
additional fora for the litigation of deprivation of nationality claims will
develop in the foreseeable future. Before such fora are established,
however, it is worth considering the substantive law that may already be
applicable to such claims.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Having discussed the situations in which it can be necessary to prove
international law nationality, it is necessary to step back and make an
important distinction: domestic law nationality and international law
nationality are neither identical nor mutually preclusive. A state's
judgment whether an individual is its national under domestic law is final
and binding within that state." However, this judgment is not conclusive
in international law. International tribunals are not infrequently faced
with claims that can only be resolved by deciding which of two or more
valid domestic-law nationalities is effective on the international level. 9
As will be discussed further in Part VI, below, international tribunals
have been fairly consistent in applying the nationality judged "dominant
and effective" at the time of the events at issue."
For now, it is sufficient to note two things. First, under the dominant
and effective nationality test, a finding by State A that an individual is its
national does not prohibit an international tribunal from determining
that, for purposes of international law, that individual in fact has the
nationality of State B." Second, and more importantly, a finding by State
A that an individual is not its national for purposes of domestic law
would not prohibit an international tribunal from finding that the
individual in question does in fact have the nationality of State A for
purposes of international law.1
2
tribunals established over the past decade: the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the new
International Criminal Court. Although these tribunals punish individuals
responsible for criminal acts rather than enforce rights against a state, the
fundamental idea is still to provide some sort of remedy for victims of human rights
violations.
21 This would not be the case, of course, if the state agreed to submit the decision
to an international tribunal, and to respect the decision of that tribunal.
'2 See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Apr. 6)
(Second Phase).
30 See infra Part VI.C.
31 See Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. 4. For an explanation of the dominant and
effective nationality test, see infra Part VI.C.1.
32 On possible remedies after such a finding, see supra Part VII.C.
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A. National Law
Naturally, proof of nationality under domestic law is governed solely
by the law of the state at issue. This generally involves proof to the
satisfaction of the competent domestic court or administrative tribunal
that a particular individual satisfies the requirements for possession of
that country's nationality. There are usually several alternative "tracks"
by which a person can possess nationality, including: birth within the
territory of the state; descent from one or more persons who at that time
possessed the nationality of the state; naturalization; and operation of
law (in cases of state succession). The way in which an individual
acquires the nationality of a state often governs the available means of
proof, which generally consists of some type of documentary evidence
accepted as probative of acquisition of nationality in a particular way."
Of course, such documents are typically conclusive only in the absence of
contrary evidence demonstrating loss of nationality or fraud in the
acquisition of the document.
B. International Law
There are several variations on the problem of proof of nationality
under international law.' The first variation arises when a person claims
to be a national of a particular state, and that state supports the claim.
The second variation occurs when two or more states claim a particular
individual to be their national, and the individual claims to be a national
of one of the states claiming him or her. The third arises when an
individual, otherwise stateless, attempts to prove that he or she is a
national of a state that denies this claim. This third variation-which has,
until now, been almost exclusively the domain of "soft law"-will be
explored in more detail below.
1. When One State Claims a Person
The simplest version of the proof of nationality problem occurs
when a single state claims a person. For instance, an individual claims to
be a national of State A, and State A supports (or does not deny) that
claim. The international tribunal hearing the case is then left to
33 For example, birth certificates are used to prove nationality by birth. and
naturalization certificates are used to prove nationality by naturalization.
34 Other situations combining these categories can of course arise. For example,
an individual who is claimed as a national by State B, but not claimed as a national by
State A, may claim to be a national of State A but not State B. The problem would be
similar, though more complicated, if States C, D, etc., also each claimed that the
individual was its national only, or if the individual claimed to qualify as a national of
more than one state. Such combined situations can be analyzed by extension of the
principles discussed below.
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determine whether the assertion of nationality is valid. The other party
may deny that the individual is a national of State A, but does not submit
any evidence as to other possible nationalities of the individual. In this
type of case, a tribunal will examine the documents that purport to
establish that the individual is a national of State A. Unless the tribunal
finds that the documents are fraudulent, were procured by fraud, or were
procured by an illegitimate favor, the tribunal will typically find that the
individual is in fact a national of State A."
2. When Two or More States Claim a Person
This second, more complex, variation has given rise to extensive case
law." As will be discussed below, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has
contributed substantially to this jurisprudence. Variations in domestic
nationality law allow for the possibility that a particular person can be a
national of State A under State A's domestic law, and at the same time
also be a national of State B under State B's domestic law. This can be
the case even if the laws of both State A and State B prohibit their
nationals from also being the national of another state.
Prior to the Second World War, international tribunals sometimes
applied a principle of non-responsibility, preventing states from
exercising diplomatic protection over an individual against a state of
which that individual was also a national.'7 By the mid-1950s, however,
international tribunals began to assert that, while an individual could
validly have more than one nationality, only one of those nationalities
could be dominant and effective for purposes of international law at any
given time. 3' This test is the one most commonly used today. It will be
discussed at greater length in Part VI.C, below.
3. When No State Claims a Person
The third variation of the proof of nationality problem has rarely
arisen in international adjudication. Nonetheless, this variation becomes
important when an individual is denationalized through some means
impermissible under international law. Interestingly, the lack of case law
is due not to its lack of importance but to a basic feature in the structure
of international tribunals. This particular feature is that, with some
35 See Flegenheimer Claim (U.S. v. Italy), 25 I.L.R. 91 (Italy-U.S. Conciliation
Comm'n 1958); see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, § 378.
36 See infra Part VI.C.1.
37 See generally Case No. A/18, Decision No. 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), 5 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (discussing this phenomenon): see also 1930 Hague
Convention, supra note 19, art. 4 ("A State may not afford diplomatic protection to
one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses.").
38 See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 t.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (Second Phase);
Merge Case, 14 R.I.A.A. 236 (June 10, 1955) (Italian-U.S. Conciliation Commission).
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exceptions, individuals have not had access to international tribunals."'
The claims of individuals have generally come before international
tribunals only when a state has filed a claim on behalf of someone whom
it claims as its national. Because a state will, quite naturally, not espouse
a claim against itself by a person whom it does not recognize as its
national, these claims have not traditionally been heard in international
tribunals."'
Thus, despite the claims of some international instruments to
regulate the deprivation of nationality,' this structural aspect of
international adjudication has often had the effect of making deprivation
of nationality-for practical purposes-wholly a matter of domestic law.
However, as discussed above, it appears that this situation is changing.
Given the substantive importance of the issues involved, it seems
worthwhile to examine this variation of the proof of nationality problem
before it becomes a procedurally more frequent occurrence. It is fitting
to begin such a discussion with an examination of the basic legal
document involved in modern international travel: the passport.
IV. THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the law of nationality, passports play a special role. Indeed, as
will be seen below, passports are uniquely probative of nationality under
international law. Were this the limit of their relevance, passports would
still be documents of substantial international legal significance.4
However, in addition to their evidentiary value, I argue that
passports are also important as a matter of substantive international law.
A central claim of this Article is that acquisition of a valid passport
fundamentally changes the international legal status of an individual in
39 There are, however, several important exceptions to this general rule. See
supra note 26. See also Part VII.A. infra.
40 Cf Kunkel et al. v. Polish State, Case No. 318, 1925-26 Ann. Dig. 418
(Germano-Polish Mixed Arb. Trib. 1925) (-[T]he Tribunal had no jurisdiction to
decide a claim against Poland by Polish nationals.").
41 See sources cited supra note 4.
42 Of course, this is by no means the limit of their relevance. In fact, passport
issuance has been important in a related area of law that is nonetheless outside the
scope of this Article. During the Cold War, substantial litigation resulted from U.S.
State Department passport policies that were said to inhibit the "right to travel." See
generally Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF
PERSONs BETWEEN STATES 29-34 (1978). Landmark decisions in this area included
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 117-120, 129-130 (1958) (overturning the State
Department policy of refusing to issue passports to individuals suspected of being
members of the Communist party) and Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 278, 309-10 (1981)
(upholding policy of revoking passports, without purporting to thereby revoke
citizenship, from individuals when there was "a substantial likelihood of serious
damage to national security or foreign policy as a result of the passport holder's
activities in foreign countries").
20041
University of California, Davis
relation to the passport-issuing state. In other words, by issuing a
passport, a state takes an action that substantially alters the legal
relationship between itself and the passport holder. My argument is that
once the passport is issued, the nationality of the passport holder
becomes a proper concern of public international law." Without a
passport, however, an individual is limited to the relatively soft
guarantees of international human rights law.
Below, I examine the passport's proof of nationality role in more
detail. Later, in Part V, I will return to the passport's significance in
substantive international law.
A. Historical Context
1. Passports and their Legal Significance
Passports, as prima facie evidence of nationality,' are "normally
accepted for the usual immigration and police purposes."' In other
words, states take daily legal action on the basis of passports issued by
other states, without taking time to investigate whether the passport
holder is "really" a national of the issuing state. If an individual travels
to France on a U.S. passport, the French border agent's decision to admit
the individual without a visa is based on the faith that the French
government places in the U.S. government's representation that the
passport holder is in fact a U.S. national. A passport in this case is
different from a national identity card, addressed only to other actors
within the issuing state.
Here, a historical note is in order. One problem that occurs in
examining the legal significance of the passport is that the term has been
used to indicate several different, but closely related, types of
documentation.' For example, it has referred to
13 Of course, it is not necessarily the case that, absent a passport, an individual's
nationality is solely an issue of domestic nationality law. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. My position, however, is that even in a case where soft law on
nationality is inapplicable or ineffective, the nationality of a passport holder is a
subject addressed effectively by hard international law.
44 See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, §§ 378 n.16, 381; WEIS, supra note 1, at
228: DANIEL C. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAWs (1972). See also
Ruinart Pere & Sons v. Franzmann, Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (May 27, 1927)
(accepting an Argentinean passport as partial evidence, together with a certificate of
release from German nationality, that the defendant was not a German national).
45 OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, §§ 378 n.16.
4h See generally WEIS, supra note 1, at 222-30: 8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-204 (1967); TURACK, supra note 44, at 15-21;
THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE STATE
(John Torpey ed., 2000). An early mention of letters used for a similar purpose can be
found in the Old Testament. See Nehemiah 2:7 (King James) ("Moreover I said unto
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an authorization to pass from a port or leave the country, or
to enter or pass through a foreign country; a permit for
soldiers to depart from their service; a sea letter and, a
document issued in time of war to protect persons from the
general operation of hostilities."
By the eighteenth century, however, the term had developed into
something more analogous to what we refer to as a "visa" today, that is, a
document issued to aliens for travel or sojourn within the territory of the
issuing state.' Although this meaning began to die out during the
nineteenth century, this sense of the term is still used in some diplomatic
and military contexts." The use of the term passport to refer to a
document issued by the country of nationality for use by the national in
other countries developed sometime in the nineteenth century, but the
practice did not become generalized until the time of the First World
War."' Thus, early sources discussing "'passports" must be interpreted in
light of this historical context.
a. Passports as Proof of Nationality in U.S. Courts: The Older Practice
The oft-cited holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Urtetiqui v.
D'Arcy' should be understood in context of these changes in the nature
and meaning of the term "passport." The passport in this case is
functionally similar to the modern passport, but the institutionalized
protections against mistake and fraud that we now associate with the
term passport had not yet developed. The resolution of this case
depended in part on the nationality of Domingo D'Arbel, one of the
plaintiffs. D'Arbel claimed to be a citizen of the United States, but the
defendants in the case tried to establish that he was instead either a
subject of the King of Spain or a native Frenchman. In order to prove his
citizenship, D'Arbel attempted to introduce a passport, signed by then-
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, which asserted that D'Arbel was
in fact a citizen of the United States. The Court held that, in general, a
passport was not admissible in court as legal evidence of citizenship."
the king, If it please the king, let letters be given me to the governors beyond the
river, that they may convey me over till I come into Judah.").
47 TURACK, supra note 44, at 15.
48 See WEIS, supra note 1, at 222-23.
49 Id. at 223.
50 Id.
51 34 U.S. 692 (1835).
52 Most of the court's language seems to indicate that a passport is never
admissible in court as evidence of citizenship. However, one statement raises the
possibility that a passport may in some special cases be admissible in evidence: "But
whether the circuit court erred in admitting the passport in evidence, under the
circumstances stated in the exception, this court is divided in opinion, and the point is
of course undecided." Urtetiqui, 34 U.S. at 699.
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This case has not been explicitly overruled by the Court, and is still
sometimes cited (for instance, by legal encyclopedias) for the proposition
that U.S. passports are not admissible as proof of citizenship in U.S.
court." This position, however, is demonstrably false. Passports are
explicitly made admissible as proof of U.S. citizenship by 22 U.S.C.
§ 2705(1)." It is not, however, only the existence of the statute which
ensures the invalidity of this case. In order to demonstrate that the
reasoning of this case is not applicable in the international context, it is
worth quoting the Court at some length:
There is some diversity of opinion on the bench, with respect
to the admissibility in evidence of this passport, arising, in
some measure, from the circumstances under which the offer
was made, and its connexion with other matters which had
been given in evidence. Upon the general and abstract
question, whether the passport, per se, was legal and
competent evidence of the fact of citizenship, we are of
opinion that it was not.
53 For instance, the version of Aneritcani Jurisprudence consulted during initial
drafting of this Article cited Urtetiqui as if it were still good law on this point. See 59
AM. JUiR. 2D § 4 (1987 and Supp. 2002) ("A passport is generally not considered legal
evidence in the courts of this country that the person to whom it was issued was a
citizen of the United States.") (citing Urtettqui, 34 U.S. 692). On March 25, 2004, the
version of American Jirisprudence available on LEXIS still contained this language.
However, the version available on Westlaw had been updated. It no longer cites
Urtetiqui, but relies instead on more recent law-including 22 U.S.C. § 2705 and the
Ninth Circuit's Magnison decision. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D § 4 (Westlaw 2004) ("A
passport is an aid in establishing citizenship for purposes of reentry into the United
States, and, if unexpired and issued for the maximum period of validity, it is regarded
as proof of United States citizenship to the same extent as a certificate of
naturalization or a certificate of citizenship.") (citations omitted).
51 The statute reads as follows:
The following documents shall have the same force and effect as proof
of United States citizenship as certificates of naturalization or of
citizenship issued by the Attorney General or by a court having
naturalization jurisdiction.
(1) A passport, during its period of validity (if such period is the
maximum period authorized by law), issued by the Secretary of State to
a citizen of the United States.
(2) The report, designated as a "Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of
the United States", issued by a consular officer to document a citizen
born abroad. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "consular
officer" includes any United States citizen employee of the Department
of State who is designated by the Secretary of State to adjudicate
nationality abroad pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary may
prescribe.
22 U.S.C. § 2705. It should be noted, however, that passports can also be issued to
non-citizens who nonetheless owe allegiance to the United States. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 212.
Passports and Nationality in International Law
There is no law of the United States, in any manner
regulating the issuing of passports, or directing upon what
evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect. It is
understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of
citizenship is required, by the secretary of state, before
issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary
with him. No inquiry is instituted by him to ascertain the fact
of citizenship, or any proceedings had, that will in any
manner bear the character of a judicial inquiry. It is a
document, which, from its nature and object, is addressed to
foreign powers; purporting only to be a request, that the
bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and is to be
considered rather in the character of a political document, by
which the bearer is recognized, in foreign countries, as an
American citizen; and which, by usage and the law of nations,
is received as evidence of the fact. But this is a very different
light, from that in which it is to be viewed in a court of justice,
where the inquiry is, as to the fact of citizenship. It is a mere
ex parte certificate; and if founded upon any evidence
produced to the secretary of state, establishing the fact of
citizenship, that evidence, if of a character admissible in a
court of justice, ought to be produced upon the trial, as
higher and better evidence of the fact."
It is apparent from this quotation that the court's decision did not
turn on whatever international character a passport may at that time
have had. Instead, it turned on the internal procedures by which the
passport had been granted. The thrust of the court's holding is that a
passport should not be accepted as evidence of citizenship when there
was no statutory requirement that the applicant establish citizenship
before the passport could be issued. Although the Court did
acknowledge that, "as a matter of practice, some evidence of citizenship
is required,""' it did not consider this practice to be sufficiently reliable to
bind a U.S. court.
b. The Modern Practice
In this light, it is easy to see how the Urtetiqui holding is largely
inapplicable to the modern passport. Today, the issuance of U.S.
passports is governed by specific provisions in the United States Code "
and the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 U.S. passports may only be
issued to citizens and noncitizen nationals, " and the application must be
55 Urtetiqui, 34 U.S. at 699.
56 Id.
57 See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 211(a)-218.
58 See generally 22 C.F.R. § 51.
59 22 U.S.C. § 212; 22 C.F.R. § 51.2(a).
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verified by oath or affirmation, in person, before a duly authorized
individual."' Photographs must be provided.6  Similarly, as long as
foreign passports are issued under some type of statutory authority, with
some reasonable procedure designed to minimize opportunities for
fraud, the reasoning of Urtetiqui should not militate against their serving
as evidence of citizenship.
The Ninth Circuit's 1990 decision in Magnuson v. Baker" is a better
statement of current U.S. law." Myers' applied for a U.S. passport on
the basis of derivative citizenship, but his application was rejected. He
requested reconsideration, and the highest ranking officer in the Seattle
passport office conducted additional research, personally concluded that
Myers was a U.S. citizen, and issued him a passport. Several months
later, an INS official wrote to the Seattle office, expressing INS
disapproval of the decision and noting that INS was attempting to deport
Myers. However, under 22 U.S.C. § 2705, the INS could not deport
Myers as long as he possessed a valid passport." Several months after
the INS letter to the Seattle passport office, a State Department official
-' 22 C.F.R. § "1.21(a).
61 Id.
' 911 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1990).
Although this case has not yet been followed by other courts, it has also not
been contradicted. The two published decisions citing the case neither question its
general reasoning nor cast any doubt on its holding that the State Department is
unable to revoke a passport based simply on a finding that its own prior determination
of the passport applicant's citizenship was erroneous. See Scales v. IN.S., 232 F.3d
1159, 1165 n.10 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Magnuson as inapplicable to a
citizenship claim by an individual born abroad to the wife of U.S. citizen, where the
individual in question apparently did not have a U.S. passport). Kelso v. U.S. Dept. of
State, 13 F.Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998) (distinguishing Magnuson as inapplicable to
passport revocation when the citizenship of the passport holder was never
challenged). Moreover, it seems to be fully consistent with a proper understanding
the relevant statutes, regulations, and case law. See also discussion supra note 53.
64 Although not important to the holding of the case, it is worth noting that Myers
was not an appealing character. He was born in Canada, but fled to the United States
after being convicted of tax evasion in Canada. He based his claim to U.S. citizenship
on a contention that his father was a naturalized U.S. citizen. At the passport office,
he was able to support this claim only with circumstantial evidence, because the
Oklahoma records that could have established his father's citizenship were
incomplete. The court noted that whether Myers should or should not have received
a passport was not at issue in the appeal. Id. at 331 n.1.
65 Id. at 333. The court stated:
Given these two effects of section 2705, Myers' passport had significant
consequences. Because the passport provided conclusive evidence of
citizenship which the INS could not collaterally attack, Myers' passport
prevented the INS from deporting him.
Id. The court also cited Matter of Villanueva, Interim Decision No. 2968, in which
"[tihe INS held that 22 U.S.C. § 2705 made a passport conclusive proof of
citizenship." Id. at 333 n.7.
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wrote to Myers, stating that the passport had been issued in error, and
demanding that he return it immediately or face a fine and/or
imprisonment. Myers requested a hearing, and when the request was
denied, sued in federal district court. The district court granted summary
judgment to Myers.
The Ninth Circuit panel upheld the decision of the district court,
explaining that 22 U.S.C. § 2705 did not grant the Secretary of State any
greater power to revoke a passport than that granted to the Attorney
General' or a district court"7 to revoke certificates of citizenship.
Because of this, the panel held that the Secretary of State could only
revoke a passport on "exceptional grounds such as fraud or
misrepresentation. "" "Second thoughts" about the decision to issue a
passport are not permissible grounds for revocation." Even when
revoking a passport on permissible grounds, the Secretary of State must
give notice and an opportunity to be heard before revoking the passport,
at least where the passport is being revoked on the ground of fraud
relating to the establishment of citizenship.'
2. Other Identity Documents
a. The Special Case of Passports Issued to Non-Nationals
In some cases, passports have been issued specifically for use by
non-nationals. Because these passports do not assert that the bearer is a
national of the issuing state, the international law relating to proof of
nationality does not apply to bearers of this type of passport. In
particular, the argument below-that the law of binding state action
prohibits denationalization of passport holders-does not apply when
the passport itself states that the bearer is a non-national.
66 The U.S. Attorney General has the authority to revoke a certificate of
citizenship or naturalization only when he is satisfied that the document was "illegally
or fraudulently obtained from, or was created through illegality or by fraud practiced
upon, him or the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner." 8 U.S.C. § 1453.
However, in order to do so he must give the certificate holder at least 60 days to show
why the certificate should not be canceled. Id. It is worth noting that "[t]he
cancellation under this section of any document purporting to show the citizenship
status of the person to whom it was issued shall affect only the document and not the
citizenship status of the person in whose name the document was issued." Id.
67 A U.S. district court has power to set aside an order admitting a person to
citizenship and to cancel the certificate of citizenship "on the ground that such order
and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Id. § t451(a). The
person whose naturalization is to be revoked must be given 60 days to answer the
charge that the certificate was fraudulently procured. Id. § t453(b).
68 Magnuson, 911 F.2d at 336.
69 See id. at 335.
70 See id. at 336.
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b. Birth Certificates and Certificates of Naturalization
As will be shown below,7' many international tribunals have
accepted birth certificates and certificates of naturalization as proof of
nationality.-' However, some have refused to do so,7" and in the past at
least one writer has asserted that it is "well established" that an
international tribunal may question the validity of a naturalization
certificate.7
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note two things. First, the
jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal strongly suggests that
birth certificates and certificates of naturalization can in some cases serve
as conclusive proof of nationality. Second, because these documents-
unlike passports-do not make any representation to foreign states, the
law of binding state action would not apply to them.
B. The Passport as Proof of Nationality in International Law
1. Significance of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal are particularly probative
as evidence of the international law of nationality.' The Tribunal has
enjoyed great prestige as a general matter, but there are two reasons that
its decisions on the nationality issue are especially influential.
First, and most importantly, these decisions are persuasive because
of the high degree of political tension associated with nationality issues
before the tribunal. In particular, the issue of jurisdiction over "dual
71 See infra Part IV.B.3.
"_ Driver's licenses and military identification are beyond the scope of this
analysis. However, one would assume that military identification would serve as
strong evidence of nationality. This would not be for any presumption of accuracy as
to nationality (if nationality were in fact listed) but for the strong value that military
service itself can have as evidence of nationality (and as a cause for losing a former
nationality). It is worth noting, however, that the law of binding state action might in
fact apply to military identification, since one of the functions of this form of
identification is presumably to identify captured military personnel to a foreign
power.
By contrast, one would also assume that a driver's license would be of little or no use
as proof of nationality, unless the laws of the issuing country actually restricted the
driving privilege to nationals. Even then, it would seem necessary to establish that
nationality was actually checked with serious care in order to use the license as proof
of nationality. It goes without saying that, since a drivers license is not directed at
another state, the law of binding state action would not apply.
73 See, e.g., Flegenheimer Claim (U.S. v. Italy), 25 I.L.R. 91, 98 (Italy-U.S.
Conciliation Comm'n 1958).
14 DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 220
n.77 (Rev. ed. 1975).
75 For a general discussion of the significance of the jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal as a source of international law, see CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON
D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 631-656 (1998).
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nationals"-persons who were both nationals of Iran under Iranian law
and nationals of the United States under U.S. law-was extraordinarily
contentious." This political fact focused the attention of both the parties
and the tribunal on this issue, ensuring that the position of each party
was thoroughly argued and that the tribunal understood the significance
of the decisions that it made.'
Second, these decisions are convincing because of their relative
youth in the realm of international law. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
was established in 1981 and continues its work today." The cases cited
below were decided between 1983 and 1989. Although fifteen to twenty
years may be a long time in some areas of U.S. domestic jurisprudence, it
is relatively short in the world of public international law." The recency
76 See. e.g., GFORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-U.S.
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 44 (1996) ("On one issue, jurisdiction over claims by dual Iranian-
United States nationals, levels of intense political sensitivity were reached that were
higher than those encountered on the merits in other cases."); Lucy F. Reed, The
Long Twilight: An Agent's Vie, of the Closing Stages, in THE IRAN-UNIlED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INFERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION: A
STUDY BY THE PANEL ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF FHE AIFRICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 339-41 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook ed., 2000) (noting
that dual national claims were "highly politicized" even after the decision in Case No.
A118, and suggesting that the Chamber Chairmen should have moved these cases
along by refusing to let Iran re-litigate the dual nationality issue each time one of
these claims arose); see also Case No. A118. Decision No. 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), 5
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (dissent of Iranian arbitrators).
7 Of course, this proposition is open to an obvious rebuttal. Shifting viewpoints
slightly, it could be argued that the contentious nature of the tribunal's dual
nationality decisions in fact reduces their probative value as evidence of current
international law. As international decisions are not per se binding on other courts,
the argument goes, they are only valid as evidence of international law to the extent
that they serve to demonstrate international law as accepted by states. It then follows
that Iran's extreme protest against these decisions suggests that they were not in
conformity with the content of international law, at least as understood by Iran, but
instead were some attempt by an international tribunal to "progressively develop" the
law.
This argument, however tempting, proves far too much. If protest by a losing state
were sufficient to strip a decision of whatever value it had as an indicator of
international law, it is hard to imagine international tribunals relying heavily on such
decisions (since, in general, at least one state will be the loser in each case). However,
even a brief survey of the opinions issued by international tribunals reveals extensive
reliance on the decisions of other tribunals.
78 See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement
Declaration), 19 January 1981, art. 2.
79 See, e.g., BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 75, at 631 ("As the International
Court of Justice recognized in Barcelona Traction, many areas of international law are
addressed by comparatively few decisions of international tribunals.") (noting also
that the subject of protection of foreign investment-a subject frequently addressed
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of these decisions is particularly relevant in relation to proof of
nationality. As demonstrated above, the nature, relevance, and
probative value of identity documents has changed with the passage of
time. As governmental ability to guarantee the accuracy of certain types
of identity documents has increased, the willingness of both domestic
courts and international tribunals to accept identity documents as proof
of the statements they contain has also increased."
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is the only significant international
tribunal that has addressed the probative value of identity documents as
proof of nationality within the past forty years. Considering the changes
that have taken place within that time in the ability of governments to
process information, its decisions in relation to this issue should be
particularly relevant as evidence of current international law.
2. A Note on Iranian Nationality Law
The attention paid by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to passports as
proof of nationality in these cases results in part from the strict
provisions of Iranian nationality law. During the relevant time period,
Iranian law required approval of the Iranian Council of Ministers for
renunciation of nationality. Once that renunciation was granted, the
expatriate was allowed to enter Iran only once, for the specific purpose
of selling or transferring all his property. After that, the expatriate was
forever barred from entering Iran." The practical result of this policy
was that most Iranians who acquired U.S. citizenship continued to use an
Iranian passport to enter and exit Iran, often for years or decades after
acquiring U.S. citizenship. Some also used the number of their Iranian
identity card to carry out certain activities (especially financial or
property-related activities) that were open only to Iranian citizens. The
U.S. government largely tolerated this practice. The result was that in
dual nationality cases, the claimants often held and used both a valid
U.S. passport and a valid Iranian passport."-
by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal-was "virtually untouched" in the "53 contentious
cases on the merits and the 48 judgments [the ICJ] had rendered in the 40 years of its
existence up to 1 July 1986").
8o It appears that national security concerns may soon push passport reliability to
a new level. A recent report indicates that the United States will soon require all
visitors to have either a machine readable passport or a visa containing biometric
identification data (such as fingerprints and a digital image of the passport holder's
face). See Land of the Free, Home of the Bar Code, in THE WORLD IN 2004 (The
Economist Newspaper Ltd. ed., 2003).
si See Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 31-157-2 (29 March 1983), 2 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 157, 167-68.
s2 It is worth noting that the Tribunal was more willing to overlook the use of the
Iranian passport to enter and exit Iran, than the use of an Iranian identity card
number to enter into some type of transaction in Iran. See, e.g., Golpira v. Iran,
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3. The Passport as Proof of Nationality
In the absence of evidence demonstrating loss of nationality, the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal accepted birth certificates and U.S. passports
listing birth in the United States as conclusive proof that the holder was a
national of the United States under U.S. law." These documents were
sufficient to prove the bearer had U.S. nationality, even prior to the date
of the document. The Tribunal also accepted naturalization documents
and U.S. passports not listing birth in the United States as conclusive
proof of U.S. nationality under U.S. law, although only for periods of
time subsequent to the date of the document.'
Award No. 32-2i-2 (29 Mar- 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 171. For a more
detailed discussion of the tribunal's jurisprudence in regard to "abuse of nationality,"
see Nancy Amoury Combs, Toward a New Understanding of Abuse of Nationahty in
Claims Before the Iran-United States Clais Tribunal, 10 AM. REv. INT'i ARB. 27
(1999).
83 See, e.g., R.N. Pomeroy v. Iran, Award No. 50-40-3 (8 June 1983) (accepting
passports and "birth registration documents" as sufficient to show shareholders' U.S.
nationality by birth); Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 133-340-3 (11 June
1984), 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 52 (accepting birth certificate and U.S. passport as
sufficient proof of majority shareholder's U.S. nationality); Michelle Danielpour v.
Iran, Award No. 424-183-3 (16 June 1989), 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 118 (accepting
birth certificate and U.S. passport as sufficient evidence of U.S. nationalit') Stephen
Joseph Danielpour v. Iran, Award No. 69-169-3 (16 June 1989), 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 123 (accepting birth certificate and U.S. passport as sufficient evidence of U.S.
nationality); Ebrahimi v. Iran, Award No. 71-44/45/40/47-3 (16 June 1989), 22 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 138 (birth certificate and U.S. passport sufficient to prove U.S.
nationality of claimant mother; birth certificates sufficient to prove U.S. nationality of
two claimant children U.S. passport and certificate of registration of birth abroad to
an American mother sufficient to prove nationality of third claimant child) Haber v.
Iran, Award No. 437-10159-3 (4 Sept. 1989), 23 Iran-U.S_ CI. Trib. Rep. 133 (accepting
U.S. passport issued after claim was filed as proof of sole shareholder's U.S.
nationality by birth): Williams v. Iran, Award No. 342-187-3 (18 Dec. 1987), 17 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 269 (accepting birth certificate as sufficient proof of US.
nationality), enforcement denied, Federal Reserve Bank of New York v. Williams, 708
F.Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that claimant was not person referred to in birth
certificate, and that the person named in the birth certificate was dead) Benedix v.
Iran, Award No. 412-256-2 (22 February 1989), 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. (accepting
birth certificate as sufficient proof of claimant husband's U.S. nationality; assuming
for purposes of award that passports are sufficient evidence to prove claimant wife's
U.S. nationality).
84 See, e.g., Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 31-157-2 (29 March 1983), 2
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 157 (accepting U.S. naturalization certificate and U.S.
passport as sufficient proof of U.S. nationality): Golpira v. Iran, Award No. 32-211-2
(29 Mar. 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 171 (apparently accepting U.S.
naturalization certificate as sufficient proof of U.S. nationality); Reza Said Malek v.
Iran, Award No. 68-193-3, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 48 (23 June 1988) (accepting
"Application for Verification of Information from Immigration and Naturalization
Service Records" as sufficient proof of U.S. nationality); Nahid (Danielpour)
Hemmat v. Iran, Award No. 70-170-3 (16 June 1989). 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 129
University of California, Davis
However, when the Tribunal was faced with competing evidence
that an individual was also a citizen of Iran under Iranian law, these
documents were not necessarily sufficient to establish U.S. nationality
under international law. This problem of dual nationality will be
explored further below." Absent an issue of dual nationality or loss of
nationality, however, a passport was treated as dispositive of the
nationality question.
V. THE LAW OF BINDING STATE ACTiON
The soft norms of human rights law address the relationship
between the individual and his or her own state, but at least in the case of
a passport holder this is not the only relationship relevant to an instance
of nationality deprivation. I argue that by issuing a passport, a state
makes a formal representation to other states that the passport holder is
its national. This act triggers the application of the body of international
law regulating state representations and other formal actions-the law of
binding state action. This body of law, properly understood, gives other
states, as well as the passport holder ,' a potential legal claim against the
denationalizing state.
Up to this point, however, the law of binding state action has been
applied only in limited contexts. When a state has in fact been found to
be bound, it has generally involved personal representations made by
heads of state and high level functionaries relating to major diplomatic
issues such as international boundaries and nuclear weaponry. With this
in mind, it might be reasonable to hesitate to apply this body of law to
passports issued to everyday people. However, such hesitation would be
mistaken. As will be explained below, intellectually consistent
application of the law of binding state action requires its extension to the
passport context. Significantly, this argument is neither radical nor new,
but has at various times been suggested-albeit in less developed form-
by respected authors' and at least one national delegation.'
(naturalization certificate sufficient to demonstrate U.S. nationality as of the date of
the certificate); Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, Award No. 490-273-1, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 196 (U.S. passport not listing birth in the United States dated prior to relevant
period for Tribunal jurisdiction sufficient to prove U.S. nationality of claimant wife;
U.S. passport not listing birth in the United States dated subsequent to relevant
period for Tribunal jurisdiction not admissible to prove U.S. nationality of claimant
husband).
85 See infra Part VI.C.
86 See infra Part VII.C.
87 See, e.g., WEIS, supra note 1, at 55-56 ("The faith of a State which has admitted
an alien on the assumption that the State of his nationality is under an obligation to
receive him back would be deceived if by subsequent denationalization this duty were
to be extinguished."); BROWNLIE 1998, supra note 14, at 407-409 (devoting an entire
subsection to the concept of "Nationality by Estoppel").
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A. Legal Principles
I use the term "law of binding state action" to describe a set of
related principles by which states have been held to have undertaken
enforceable legal obligations without entering into formal international
agreements. These have variously been referred to as estoppel,
preclusion, acquiescence, and unilateral action. Estoppel, preclusion,
and acquiescence come from an old and venerable tradition, and they are
more or less generally accepted in international law. By contrast,
unilateral action is still relatively young and radical: neither the contours
of its applicability nor its advisability as a matter of policy has yet been
settled. 9  Importantly, both the older principles and their newer
counterpart share a common theme: formal actions taken by a state may,
in some circumstances, serve to bind that state in the future.
These principles are not, to my knowledge, codified in any major
international agreement. Instead, they are based on international
custom"' and general principles" derived from the major domestic legal
M5 Over 70 years ago, the British delegate to the Hague Codification Conference
of 1930 asserted that:
[A] kind of contract or obligation results from the granting of a passport
to an individual by a state so that when that individual enters a foreign
state with that passport, the State whose territory he enters is entitled to
assume that that the other State whose nationality he possesses will
receive him back in certain circumstances.
WEIS 1956, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting Acts of the Hague Conference for the
Codification of International Law, Vol.11-Minutes of the First Committee:
Nationality, League of Nations Doc. No. 351 (a). M. 145 (a). 1930. V., Series of
League of Nations Publications V. Legal 1930. V. 15).
"I See W. Michael Reisman, Unratified Treaties and Other Unperfected Acts in
International Law: Constitutional Functions, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 729, 737, 743-45
(2002).
90 In the traditional view, custom shares pride of place with treaties atop the
hierarchy of international norms. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, §§ 9-11. The
Oppenheim editors define custom as "a clear and continuous habit of doing certain
actions which has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are,
according to international law. obligatory or right." Id. § 10. Custom is
distinguishable from a simple usage, which is "a habit of doing certain actions which
has grown up without there being the conviction that these actions are, according to
international law, obligatory or right." Id. The requirement that such a habit take
place out of a sense of legal obligations is often termed opinio juris. Id. See also
Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-277 (Nov. 20) (defining custom under the ICJ
Statute); North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (defining opinio juris).
On custom more generally, see ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
91 A number of influential texts in fact provide for direct reliance on such general
principles. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 16, art. 38(c) (permitting the court to
apply, in the absence of applicable treaty provision or custom, "the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations"): RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]
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systems in the world. 2 Although not, in a formal sense, "judicially
created," their applicability in international law is demonstrated by a
long series of authoritative and controlling decisions." While the
published opinions of courts and international tribunals are an important
component of this body of decisions, the decisions of other international
actors also bear substantial weight.'
(asserting that a "supplementary" rule of international law can be discovered "by
derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world...
even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement").
12 For those who subscribe to a formalistic definition of the sources of
international law, such as that set out in Article 38 of the ICJ statute, there is some
disagreement as to whether international law estoppel is properly analyzed as custom
under Article 38(l)(b) or general principle under Article 38(1)(c). Compare H.
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(XI IH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION) vii-ix, 203-205 (1927)
(suggesting that estoppel should be applied as a general principle of law) with
ANitONE MARTIN, LESTOPPEL EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: PRECEDE D'UN
APER(U DE LA THtORIE DE LESTOPPEL EN DROIT ANGLAiS 240-46 (1979) (arguing
that estoppel should not be considered a general principle of law, but instead a rule of
customary international law). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 91, § 102,
comment 1. ("General principles may also provide rules of reason of a general
character, such as acquiescence and estoppel . . . international practice may also
convert such a principle into a rule of customary law."); I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in
International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 468, 468 (1958) ("The question of whether
the judicial basis of the doctrine of estoppel is to be found in customary international
law rather than in the 'general principles of law' is not free from difficulty .... ").
However, it is not necessary for our purposes to resolve this disagreement. It is
sufficient merely to note that both sides do consider the principle of estoppel to be
applicable in international law.
93 See generallv W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of
International Law, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118, 121 (1992) (arguing that law
should be understood not as a body of formal rules but as a series of authoritative and
controlling decisions).
94 In particular, official positions taken by the foreign offices of influential states
may shed important light on the beliefs of major international actors about what
constitutes binding law. In this regard, the numerous instances in which states have
taken litigating positions relying on estoppel and related principles provides
additional support for their existence as legal rules. For a small sampling of these
cases, see infra note 97.
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1. Estoppel and Related Principles
Estoppel and related principles " have long been accepted as playing
some role in public international law."' They have repeatedly been raised
by parties litigating before the ICJ, and have been discussed in majority
opinions published by that body." They have also been discussed by
95 Several authors have attempted to distinguish estoppel from its related
principles. For example. Bowett argues that an admission is created in many
situations where a necessary condition for full estoppel is absent. Such an admission
is less harmful than estoppel to the rights of the party against whom it operates. D.W.
Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence, 176
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176, 195-97 (1957) ("An estoppel will exclude altogether evidence
of a disputed fact, whereas an admission will either render evidence superfluous
where there is no other evidence to contradict the admission or, where there is such
contradictory evidence, will weaken or perhaps nullify the contradictory evidence.").
Acquiescence, a term describing a state's failure to protest a given action, can
sometimes be sufficient to give rise to an estoppel. Id. at 198-99. However, it should
not be confused with acquisition of territory rights by prescription, which depends on
the acquiescence of all states, or at least all those adversely affected by the acquisition.
See id. at 200.
Similarly, Sinclair, while stressing "the common ancestry of [the concepts of
acquiescence and estoppel] in the principles of good faith and equity," has noted that
the ICJ has been substantially more willing to find acquiescence than "an estoppel in
the strict sense." Sinclair, Estoppel and acquiescence, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ,
supra note 5, at 106, 120. In the end, the case law of the ICJ demonstrates "that there
is a close link between the two concepts, and that they must be considered as part of
the wider pattern of state conduct which an international tribunal may find to be
relevant to the determination of an international dispute." Id. at 120.
96 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 92, at 203-211 (1927) (discussing these principles
and their derivation from private law). See also MARTIN, supra note 92, at 240-46.
Bowett, supra note 95, at 176: Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice 1960-1989: Part One, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1989).
MacGibbon, supra note 92. at 4is8-71.
97 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El.
Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92, 118-19 (Sept. 13) (Application by Nicaragua for
Permission to Intervene), Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 280, 304-311 (Oct. 12, 1984):
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. / F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I-C.J. 3, 26 (Feb.
20, 1969): Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962
I.C.J. 6, 32 (June 15) (Merits) (holding that Tailand was precluded by its later
diplomatic conduct from asserting that it did not accept the boundary marked in a
1908 map). See also Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 39-51 (June 15) (Merits) (separate opinion of Vice-President
Alfaro) (arguing that estoppel. preclusion, forclusion, and acquiescence are all slightly
incorrect terms for the principle "that a State party to an international litigation is
bound by its previous acts or attitude when they are in contradiction with its claims in
the litigation," and discussing cases in which this principle has played a role); Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 52-66
(June 15) (Merits) (separate opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice); Case Concerning the
Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.),
1960 I.C.J. 189, 222, 236-38 (Nov. 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Urrutia
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other international tribunals." A former Legal Advisor to the British
Foreign and Commonwealth Office has noted the importance of these
principles to government lawyers, especially those involved in litigating
territorial disputes.'" A review of some of the more well-known cases
involving estoppel and related principles will highlight the general issues
involved."'
In the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, the ICJ found
that Thailand's actions, over a period of more than fifty years, had
demonstrated its acceptance of a 1908 map placing an archeologically
important temple in Cambodia.'" This demonstrated acceptance
,'precluded" Thailand from asserting at the time of the case that it was
not bound by the map, despite the fact that Thailand was correct that the
map did not follow the watershed line that a 1904 treaty provided it
Holguin) (accepting the existence of a principle of estoppel in international law but
rejecting its applicability on the facts of the case before the court).
98 See, e.g., Flegenheimer Clain (U.S. v. Italy), 25 I.L.R 91, 151-53 (Italy-U.S.
Conciliation Comm'n 1958) (noting existence of principle of estoppel but rejecting
principle of "apparent nationality"): id. at 155 (refusing to apply principle of estoppel
to bind Italian government to an Italian -language version of the treaty, when the
Italian version was prepared by all governments working together and was not a
legally operative text).
" See Sinclair, supra note 95, at 106, 106-120 (noting the importance of these
principles and discussing major ICJ cases in which they have been raised).
I'l Here, a cautionary note is in order. The ICJ is not by any means a "supreme
court" for issues of international law, and (absent some specific treaty provision) its
decisions arc not formally binding on other international tribunals. In fact, prior ICJ
decisions are-again speaking formally-not even binding on the ICJ itself. See ICJ
Statute, supra note 16, Article 38(1)(d) (noting that "judicial decisions" are only a
"subsidiary means for the determination of international law."). Looking at actual
practice, however, Article 38(1)(d) is somewhat misleading. The ICJ regularly relies
on its prior decisions, and its substantial moral authority has frequently led other
international tribunals to rely on its decisions as well. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 11,
§ 13 ("The International Court of Justice, while prevented from treating its previous
decisions as binding, has, in the interests of judicial consistency, referred to them with
increasing frequency."); Case No. A118, Decision No. 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), 5
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, (relying heavily on the ICJ's Nottebohm decision).
Despite this potential moral authority, I do not rely on these decisions as a source for
any rule of law. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 90-94, estoppel
and related principles can be accepted as either international custom, general
principles of law, or legal rules demonstrated through a series of authoritative and
controlling decisions by relevant international actors. Their existence-in some
form-as a rule of decision for international tribunals is not seriously contested.
However, these judicial decisions are important for another reason. They serve as an
example of how one important international tribunal has applied this body of law. As
we consider the application of these rules in a new factual context-that of passports
and nationality-these past applications can provide important guidance as to how
these principles should properly be applied.
101 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J.
6, 32 (June 15) (Merits).
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would follow.0 2 Although the majority opinion in Preah Vihear did not
discuss the principle of estoppel on a theoretical level,' 3 two separate
opinions discussed estoppel and related principles at length."
A majority of the court discussed the principle of estoppel in the
North Sea Continental Shelf case, but did not apply it on the facts before
the court."' The relevant issue was whether West Germany was bound
by Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, which it
had signed but not ratified." Denmark and the Netherlands, the other
102 Id.
103 In fact, the majority opinion mentioned the word "estoppel" only in a summary
of Thailand's conclusion that "[]here is no room in the circumstances of the present
case for the application in favour of Cambodia of any of the doctrines prayed in aid by
Counsel for Cambodia, whether acquiescence, estoppel or prescription." Id. at 12.
104 In the first separate opinion, Vice-President Alfaro discussed the principle
which he believed to be behind the majority's decision. He argued that it was at least
misleading, and perhaps inaccurate, to refer to this principle under the domestic law
labels often used-"estoppel, preclusion, forclusion, [and] acquiescence." The
essence of the principle, he explained, was simply that "a State party to an
international litigation is bound by its previous acts or attitude when they are in
contradiction with its claims in the litigation." Id. at 39 (separate opinion of Vice-
President Alfaro). The remainder of the opinion reviewed the different cases in
which this principle had been applied. Id. at 41-42 (separate opinion of Vice-
President Alfaro).
In a second separate opinion, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice also discussed the theoretical
basis for estoppel. Id. at 62-65 (separate opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice). In doing
so, he took pains to distinguish an assertion of estoppel from an assertion that a state
is simply bound by an obligation it has undertaken. In the case of a standard
obligation, it must simply be shown that a state had in fact undertaken the obligation
in order to demonstrate that the state was bound by the obligation. A successful
assertion of estoppel, by contrast, blocks a state from denying something that it might
in fact otherwise have every right to deny. In other words, estoppel prevents the state
from asserting what might in fact be a true claim, on the ground that the state's prior
inconsistent action had given other parties reason to believe that it would not make
such an assertion. See id. at 63 (separate opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice) ("In
other words, if the denial can be shown to be false, there is no room or need for any
plea of preclusion or estoppel. Such a plea is essentially a means of excluding a denial
that might be correct[-]irrespective of its correctness. It prevents the assertion of
what might in fact be true.").
105 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. / F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26
(Feb. 20, 1969).
106 Article 6 of this convention provided for delimitation according to the
equidistance principle. In most circumstances, this principle operated to grant each
country a portion of continental shelf roughly proportionate to the length of its
coastline. However, when applied to a severely concave coastline, bordered on each
side by two other states-like that of West Germany on the North Sea-the
equidistance principle would operate to give the state with the concave coastline a
smaller share of the continental shelf that the length of its coastline would otherwise
seem to warrant. Apparently realizing the consequences of the equidistance method
after it signed the convention, West Germany made the understandable decision not
to proceed with ratification. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
University of California, Davis [Vol. 10:301
parties to the case, stood to gain a considerable amount of territorial sea
if West Germany were bound by the convention. They put forward
several different theories of how West Germany could have bound itself
to the convention regime,"7 but the court rejected each of them."' The
majority concluded that Article 6 could only bind West Germany if West
Germany were in fact estopped from denying the article's applicability.
Such an estoppel could be created by past conduct by West Germany
which both (1) demonstrated clear and consistent acceptance of the
convention regime; and (2) caused Denmark or the Netherlands to suffer
some detriment as a result of reliance on that past conduct. The majority
did not find an estoppel on the facts presented."
Moving from territorial disputes to the subject of this Article, it
seems that the principle of estoppel should prevent a state from denying
that a passport holder is in fact its national. Passports listing nationality
are clear assertions by a state that it wishes other states to treat an
individual as its national. They are relied upon by other states in the
enforcement of their own domestic laws-most frequently at border
crossings, but also in the enforcement of other internal laws and
international treaty obligations.
107 They asserted that despite West Germany's failure to ratify the convention, it
had conducted itself in such a way that the convention regime-and especially Article
6-should be considered to bind the state. In this regard, Denmark and the
Netherlands asserted that West Germany had either (1) unilaterally assumed the
obligations of the convention through its public statements and proclamations (2)
manifested an acceptance of the general regime of the convention or (3) recognized
the convention as being generally applicable to continental shelf delimitation. Id. at
25.
1o8 The majority noted first that only a very clear and consistent course of conduct
could suffice to bind a state in West Germany's situation, and expressed doubts as to
whether it could be assumed that this existed when West Germany had not in fact
ratified the convention-which would, after all, have been the most effective way to
express its consent. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. at 25-26. Second, it noted that if West
Germany had ratified the convention, it would have had the option to enter a
reservation to Article 6, since reservations were permitted under Article 12 of the
convention. Id. at 25-26.
09 The exact words of the majority were:
Having regard to these considerations of principle, it appears to the
Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to
lend substance to this contention.-that is to say if the Federal Republic
were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conventional
regime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only
clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that regime, but also had
caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct,
detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there
is no evidence whatever in the present case.
Id. at 26.
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The applicability of the principle of estoppel is most clear when the
passport has been used-prior to the denationalization in question-to
enter the territory of the state asserting the claim on behalf of the
passport holder. In such a situation, a claiming state's reliance on the
passport in its decision to admit the individual should satisfy the
requirement that, to support an actual estoppel, a state must be able to
demonstrate that it had suffered some disadvantage from its reliance on
the passport.''
This is not to say, however, that detrimental reliance could not be
demonstrated in other contexts as well. In particular, there are at least
two ways that an individual passport holder could demonstrate
detrimental reliance. First, a passport holder denationalized while
abroad has almost certainly relied on the passport in his or her decision
to travel, in the mistaken belief that he or she could safely return to the
territory of the passport-issuing state. Second, a passport holder
denationalized while within the state may also have detrimentally relied
on his or her possession of a passport. Such reliance might include
decisions to acquire real property or make other investments that a
rational person would be unlikely to make without confidence in the
security of his or her nationality. Conversely, for a person with
substantial holdings in such investments, detrimental reliance might
include a decision not to liquidate them and flee the country.
2. Unilateral Action
A second, less well-established part of the law of binding state action
may also be applicable in the passport context: the principle of unilateral
action."' The Nuclear Tests case is perhaps the most famous statement of
this principle.12 Here, Australia challenged the French practice of
conducting atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Between the
time the case was filed and the time the court reached its decision,
110 This disadvantage would be most acute if the passport holder is otherwise
stateless, because the claiming state would then have no guaranteed location to which
it could deport the passport holder.
nl See generally Nuclear Tests, 1974 1.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Victor Rogriguez Cede no,
Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Fifth Report on Unilateral Acts of
States, April 4, 2002. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/525, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/54/
54docs.htm.; OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, § 576; BROWNLIE 1998, supra note 14, at 642-
45; PIERRE-MARIE DupUy, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (4th ed. 1998); J.H.W.
VERZIJL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 105-111 (1973); ERIC
Suy, LES ACTES JUIRIDIOUES UNILAT-ERAUX EN DROIT INTERNAI IONAL PUBLIC (1962);
Philippe Cahier, Le comportement des etats conmme source de drotts et d'obligations, in
RECUIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM
237 (1968) ; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Unilateral Acts of States, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW : ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 221 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed. 1991).
112 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
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however, a series of high-level French officials-including the President
of the Republic-made public statements that the then-ongoing series of
nuclear tests being conducted in the South Pacific would be the last series
of atmospheric tests necessary to the French nuclear program. In a
decision that has been taken by some as a "broad statement of
principle ..... the court asserted that:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may
have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of
this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers
on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the
State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of
this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound,
even though not made within the context of international
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in
the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance
of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other
States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since
such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly
unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made.
The Court held that the various statements by French government
officials were the type of action that would qualify as such a binding
unilateral commitment."'
B. Passports and Binding State Action
The situations in which the law of binding state action has so far
been applied have an important characteristic in common: they are
major state actions taking place at the highest levels of international
diplomacy. The decision to commit a state to one of these actions is
typically made by politically responsible actors or high-level
functionaries. With this in mind, passport issuance does not at first seem
to fit in with the other actions. Although nationality laws are
13 Thirlway, supra note 96, at 8.
114 The court then held that such a commitment satisfied Australia's request to the
court, and thus no further dispute existed between the parties. It therefore had no
occasion to make any further determination. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 271 ("The
Applicant has repeatedly sought from the Respondent an assurance that the tests
would cease, and the Respondent has, on its own initiative, made a series of
statements to the effect that they will cease. Thus the Court concludes that, the
dispute having disappeared, the claim advanced by Australia no longer has any object.
It follows that any further finding would have no raison d'etre.").
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promulgated by politically responsible actors, the decision to grant a
passport to a particular individual is generally taken at a much lower
level of government. Moreover, if the individual in question has fulfilled
a certain set of requirements, the decision often involves little or no
discretion on the part of the responsible official.
Nonetheless, I argue that passport issuance is a suitable triggering
event for the law of binding state action. The common core of these
doctrines is that certain representations made by a state can in the future
have a binding effect on that state. It is clear that, at a minimum,
representations made by heads of state'" and senior government officials
with a responsibility for foreign affairs"' can have this effect. It is also
clear, however, that representations made by lower level government
officials operating outside their sphere of competence will not have this
effect."7 Thus, the operative question becomes whether issuance of a
passport is more like a representation by a senior government officer
operating in his or her area of competence or more like a representation
by a lower level official acting outside of his or her authority.
Although it may initially appear to be a routine administrative
action, passport issuance should in fact be considered a binding
representation by the issuing state. First, a fundamental purpose of
passport issuance is to represent to foreign governments that the
passport holder is a national of the issuing state."' Second, lower-level
officials making decisions on passport issuance are generally operating
within their specialized sphere of competence and under the direction of
senior, politically responsible authorities."' Third, the statement of
nationality contained in a typical passport is far more clear and
is See id. at 267, 272 (Dec. 20) (finding that statements by the French president
were sufficient to bind France).
116 See Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 53. (finding that a statement by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the Danish Minister that "the Norwegian Government would not make any
difficulties in the settlement of this question" was sufficient to bind the Norwegian
government).
117 See Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 t.C.J. 246, 307-08 (Oct. 12) (letter from Assistant
Director for Lands and Minerals in the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (part of the
U.S. Department of the Interior) not sufficient to bind the U.S. government in regard
to its international maritime boundary).
118 Of course, this does not apply in the special case of passports issued to non-
nationals. See supra Part IV.A.2.a. A passport issued to a non-national would not
implicate many of the argument's presented here, since the issuing state would not
necessarily have any special knowledge as to the passport holder's nationality (or lack
thereof, in the case of a stateless individual).
119 Even if this is not true in a particular case, strong policy arguments exist for
establishing a presumption that passports are issued under the careful direction of
responsible authorities. See infra Part V.B.
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unequivocal' 2 than the type of representation that has been found to be
sufficient in the contexts of both unilateral action"' and estoppel.
Fourth. many passports are phrased in the language of diplomatic
communication,' or considered to be government property.' Fifth, the
120 Such a statement is more clear and formal, in fact, than an assertion by a head
of state in a press conference that his country would not conduct atmospheric tests in
the future, where the meaning of the message turned in part on the failure to qualify
the assertion with the word normrallement, as had been done in the past. See Nuclear
Tests, 1974 IC.J. at 266.
121 See id. at 267-72.
122 See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962
I.C.J. t, 32-33 (June 15) (Merits).
123 See, e.g., Canadian Passport issued January 8, 2003 ("The Secretary of State for
External Affairs of Canada requests in the name of Her Majesty the Queen, all those
whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and
to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary."): Mexican
Passport issued December 24, 2003 ("The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the United
Mexican States requests the competent authorities to grant the bearer of this passport,
a Mexican citizen, free transit without any delay or hindrance, and to offer him all
possible assistance and protection."); Nicaraguan Passport issued July 12, 1993 ("The
bearer of the present passport is a Nicaraguan citizen. Therefore, the Government of
the Republic of Nicaragua applies to the National and Foreign Authorities to give the
bearer of the present document all the facilities available for his normal movement
and to give him, if necessary, any help and cooperation that may be useful to him.");
Nigerean Passport issued February 22, 1990 ("These are to request and require in the
name of the President and Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely
without let or hindrance and to afford him or her every assistance and protection of
which he or she mas stand in need."), United Kingdom Passport issued November 15,
1995 ("Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State Requests and requires in the Name
of Her Majesty all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely
without let or hindrance and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as
may be necessary"): United States Passport issued May 11, 1998 ("The Secretary of
State of the United States of America hereby requests all whom it may concern to
permit the citizen/national of the United States named herein to pass without delay or
hindrance and in case of need to give all lawful aid and protection."). But see German
passport issued April 28, 2000 (making no specific request on the part of German
authorities).
14 See, e.g , Canadian Passport issued January 8, 2003 ("This passport is the
property of the government of Canada."): German Passport issued April 28, 2000
("This passport is the property of the Federal Republic of Germany."); Nigerian
Passport issued February 22, 1990 ("This passport remains the property of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and may be withdrawn at any time.");
United Kingdom Passport issued November 15, 1995 ("This passport remains the
propert of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and may be
withdrawn at any time.); United States Passport issued May 1t, 1998 ("This passport is
the property of the United States government. It must be surrendered upon demand
if made by an authorized representative of the United States government.").
Some states explicitly warn of criminal penalties associated with unauthorized
passport alteration. See United States Passport issued May 11, 1998 ("This passport
must not be altered or mutilated in any way. Alteration may make it invalid, and, if
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consequences of holding a state bound in regard to a particular
individual's nationality are much less severe than those at issue in the
classic cases of unilateral action'12 and estoppel.'26 Sixth, absent
willful, may subject you to prosecution. Only authorized officials of the United States
or of foreign countries, in connection with official matters, may place stamps or make
statements, notations, or additions in this passport."). Others make no specific
mention of criminal penalties, but strongly suggest that passport alteration is
prohibited. See Canadian Passport issued January 8, 2003 ("This passport .... must
not be altered. You must take every precaution to safeguard it."); United Kingdom
Passport issued November 15 1995 ("This passport .... should not b, tampered with
or passed to an unauthorized person. Any case of loss or destruction should be
immediately reported to the local police and to the nearest British passport issuing
authority (eg Passport Office, London; British Consulate; British High Commission or
Colonial authority), only after exhaustive enquiries can a replacement be issued in
such circumstances. The passport of a deceased person should be submitted for
cancellation to the nearest such passport authority, it will be returned on request.").
The close association of passports and citizenship is further marked by the inclusion in
some passports of information of loss of citizenship, military obligations, and dual
nationality. See, e.g., Canadian Passport issued January 8, 2003 ("Canadians may have
dual nationality through birth, descent, marriage or naturalization. They are advised
that while in the country of their other nationality they may be subject to all its laws
and obligations, including military service."); United Kingdom Passport issued
November 15. 1995 ("British citizens have the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
No right of abode in the United Kingdom derives from the status, as British nationals.
of British Dependent Territories citizens, British Nationals (Overseas), British
Overseas citizens, British protected persons and British subjects."); id. ("British
nationals who are also nationals of another country cannot be protected by Her
Majesty's Representatives against the authorities of that country. If, under the law of
that country, they are liable for any obligation (such as military service), the fact that
they are British nationals does not exempt them from it. A person having some
connection with a Commonwealth or foreign country (eg by birth, by descent thought
either parent, by marriage or by residence) may be a national of the country, in
addition to being a British national. Acquisition of British nationality or citizenship
by a foreigner does not necessarily cause the loss of nationalitv of origin."): United
States Passport issued May 11, 1998 ("Under certain circumstances, you may lose your
U.S. citizenship by performing any of the following acts: (1) being naturalized in a
foreign state, (2) taking an oath or making a declaration to a foreign state; (3) serving
in the armed forces of a foreign state; (4) accepting employment with a foreign
government; (5) formally renouncing U.S. citizenship before a U.S. consular office
overseas."); id. ("A person who has the citizenship of more than one country at the
same time is considered a dual citizen. Citizenship may be based on facts of birth,
marriage, parentage, or naturalization. A dual citizen may be subject to all of the laws
of the other country that considers that person its citizen while in its jurisdiction. This
includes conscription for military service."). See also id. ("Your passport is a valuable
citizenship and identity document, so it should be carefully safeguarded.") (emphasis
added).
125 See, e.g., Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 269-70 (enforceable obligation to halt
atmospheric testing).
126 See, e.g., Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 32-33, 36-37 (international boundary);
Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53. (obligation not to contest Danish sovereignty over Eastern Greenland).
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application of these principles in the passport context, a state would be
able to attribute its nationality to anyone it wished, perhaps in exchange
for an agreement to pay a certain amount of taxes, without fear of ever
being required to admit the individual back within its borders later on.
C. Policies Underlying the International Law of Nationality
Strong policy arguments also exist for imposing liability on the
issuing state for errant statements of nationality in its passports.1' First,
the issuing state can determine nationality under its domestic law more
easily than any other state. Second, imposition of liability on the issuing
state creates incentives conducive to orderly administration of the
international movement of persons.
The passport-issuing state is by definition the only state having full
access to records relating to whether the individual to whom the passport
is issued is a national of that state under its domestic law. Suppose that
State A issues a passport to a particular individual. Although a court of
State B might examine the nationality laws of State A to determine
whether that individual is a State A national, absent the cooperation of
State A it would not even have access to a full factual record. Even if
State A were to cooperate, the process would be long and difficult, and
the State B court-having no coercive authority over State A agencies-
would have no way of knowing whether State A was providing all
relevant information.
Moreover, even if the State B court were to gather an adequate
factual record, it would not be competent to make a final determination
as to whether the individual was a State A national under State A law. In
the case that the judge were sufficiently familiar with State A law to
apply it in a technically proper manner, this would still not overcome the
problem of its lack of competence to exercise any element of discretion
allowed under the law. Thus, determination of foreign nationality is
difficult even in the forum most suited to such a determination-an
administrative or judicial court.
Yet the venue in which states are most often forced to make
determinations of foreign nationality is not the court but the border
crossing. In this situation, State B is simply not able to examine in detail
the elements that may or may not qualify an individual as a national of
State A. Instead, State B is forced to rely on State A's passport-its
decision whether to count the individual as a State A national must rest
127 It is worth noting that the policy analysis developed here, while not based
formally on economic theory, is similar to the type of analysis that might be developed
through formal economic analysis of the law.
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solely on a determination of whether the passport is genuine."' Given
the nature of modern international travel, it is hard to imagine a
functional system that does not assume that states are entitled to rely on
passports issued by other states in making routine decisions to admit or
exclude.
A decision to make states responsible for assertions of nationality in
their passports creates incentives conducive to the establishment of basic
order in the world system. Excessive difficulties associated with
investigations of nationality at the border militate in favor of the
establishment of a system holding the passport-issuing state responsible
for statements of nationality in its passports, even if made by erroneous
application of the issuing state's law.
2
1
VI. EXCEPriONS
There are three major exceptions to the applicability of the law of
binding state action to passport -issuing states: loss of nationality, fraud,
and certain instances of dual nationality."" These exceptions are not part
of this body of law, but situations in which an essential precondition for
its applicability is not present.
A. Fraud
The first situation in which this body of law should not apply occurs
when the state can demonstrate that the passport was acquired by
fraudulent means. A state could make this showing in two ways. The
first possibility is for the state to show that the passport holder knowingly
made a false representation as to a fact material to the determination of
her nationality, either in the application for the passport itself or during
an earlier naturalization proceeding. The second possibility is for the
state to show that the passport would not have been issued but for
bribery or some other illegal procedure."
128 This of course excludes the situation where State B asserts that the individual is
in fact (or also) a national of State B-in this case State B should have some
independent basis on which to make the determination.
129 One well-known British case has held that an individual owes allegiance to
Britain as long as he holds an unexpired British passport, even if the passport's
statement that the bearer is a British subject is later shown to be erroneous. See Joyce
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347 (holding that, so long as he held a
British passport, an individual who was in fact an American citizen at the time he was
issued the British passport could nonetheless be found guilty of treason for actions
taken while abroad).
130 Similarly, in the proof of nationality context, the circumstances described in
these exceptions would serve to rebut the presumption of nationality established by a
valid passport. See supra Part IV.
131 Importantly, this exception should not allow a state to deny the nationality of a
passport holder who had merely paid an "expected bribe" connected in many states
20041
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B. Loss of Nationality
The second situation where the law of binding state action should
not apply occurs when the passport holder has, since the date the
passport was issued, lost the nationality of the issuing state through some
means not in violation of international law. The reasoning behind this
exception is simple. A passport"' is an assertion that, as of the date on
which the passport is issued, the passport holder has the nationality of
the issuing state. If the passport holder voluntarily gives up that
nationality, that individual should not be able to hold the issuing state
responsible for a prior assertion of nationality. If the passport holder is
deprived of nationality, the state can avoid responsibility by (1)
attempting to recall the passport and (2) notifying all countries with
which it has diplomatic relations that the passport in question is no
longer valid. Until it has completed both of these actions, the law of
binding state action will hold it responsible for the issuance of the
passport, even if the passport holder is no longer a national of the
country under its own domestic law.
C. Dual Nationality
The third exception applies in cases of dual nationality. A person
may be a national of two or more states under each state's domestic law,
even though the law of one state prohibits dual nationality. A related
problem can arise when a state limits voluntary renunciation of
nationality.
1. The Dominant and Effective Nationality Test
In the period before World War II, the general rule was that
nationality laws were governed entirely by each state's domestic law."'
Situations often arose, however, where this rule did not seem
appropriate: sometimes the operation of domestic laws led to an
individual having more than one nationality, and sometimes to an
individual having no nationality at all."
The most notable effort to address these problems was the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
with the processing of normal administrative actions. A finding of bribery should
require that the state show not only that the passport would not have been issued but
for the bribe, but that for some relevant factual or legal reason the passport should
not have been issued to the individual in question.
132 This assumes, of course, that the passport does make an assertion as to
nationality. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.
t33 See, e.g., 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 19; DONNER, supra note 26, at 29.
134 DONNER, supra note 26, at 29.
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Nationality Laws."3 The basic approach of the convention was to
prohibit states from asserting protection over a dual national against a
state whose nationality that person also possessed.'36 State-parties to the
convention would recognize only one nationality of a dual national, and
would apparently specify in advance whether this would be the
nationality of the place where he was "habitually and principally
resident" or the nationality of the place to which "in the circumstances
he appears to be in fact most closely connected."''
During this time, however, a practice also began to develop in
international arbitral tribunals to look, when faced with an actual conflict
of nationality laws, for the nationality which was more "real and
effective." ' Faced with a situation not of dual nationality but diplomatic
protection, the International Court of Justice adopted this test in the
Nottebohm case."' Months afterward, the Italian-U.S. Conciliation
135 Cf Harvard Draft Code on Nationality. The code is discussed in DONNER,
supra note 26, at 50-53 ("The Harvard Draft Code on Nationality, prepared in
anticipation of the first conference on the codification of international law at the
Hague in 1930, is considerably more innovative than the Hague Convention itself.").
136 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 4 ("A State may not afford
diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such
person also possesses.").
137 Id. art 5.
138 DONNER, supra note 26, at 61.
139 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (Second Phase). In
this case, Liechtenstein claimed the right to exercise diplomatic protection over
Freidrich Nottebohm. Mr. Nottebohm was bon in Germany, lived most of his adult
life in Guatemala (where he owned substantial assets), and was naturalized as a
Liechtenstein citizen shortly after the outbreak of World War II. He then returned to
Guatemala on a Liechtenstein passport in early 1940, but was arrested as a German
national and deported to the United States in 1943. He was interned there in until
1946, and upon his release returned to Liechtenstein and established himself there.
Guatemala began expropriating Nottebohm's property in 1949.
Although several aspects of Nottebohm's Liechtenstein naturalization were
questionable (including what appeared to be a waiver of the normal pre-
naturalization residency in return for an agreement to pay substantial taxes), the court
refused to examine the validity of the Nottebohm's nationality under the law of
Liechtenstein. It instead framed the case as presenting the question of whether
Guatemala was required to recognize Liechtenstein's action granting Nottebohm
Liechtenstein nationality, so as to be required to allow Liechtenstein to exercise
diplomatic protection on Nottebohm's behalf. In effect, the court recognized as valid
Liechtenstein's claim that, under its own law, Nottebohm was a Liechtenstein
national, and moved to examine whether the grant of nationality was sufficiently
proper under international law to require Guatemala to recognize Liechtenstein's
claim.
In order to do this, the court followed what it explained to be the established practice
of international arbitrators and national courts to look for the "real and effective
nationality" in any case where a person might be a national of more than one state. It
noted that Nottebohm would qualify as a national of Liechtenstein under
international law if his connections with Liechtenstein during the period of time
University of California, Davis [Vol. 10:301
Commission followed the same approach in a situation of dual
nationality in the Merge case. 4  Since this time-with only minor
exceptions -the Nottebohm./Merg "dominant and effective nationality
test" has become the settled law for dealing with dual nationality
problems.
Most notably, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal applied the dominant
and effective nationality test to its dual nationality claims. As discussed
above,' the admissibility of claims of "dual" Iran-U.S. nationals was
immediately before, during, and after his naturalization were stronger than his
connection with any other state during that period. The court also emphasized the
serious character of an act of naturalization, and cautioned against considering it only
in relation to its effect on Nottebohm's property.
Applying this test, the court found that Nottebohm had strong factual connections to
both Germany and Guatemala during the relevant time period, but very little
connection to Liechtenstein. It held that his naturalization, not being based on any
real connection to Liechtenstein, did not require Guatemala to allow Liechtenstein to
exercise diplomatic protection on his behalf.
For an in depth discussion of Nottebohm and its relation to the international law of
nationality more generally, see Ian Brownlie, Relations of Nationality in Public
International Law, 39 BRir. Y.B. INT'L L. 284 (1963).
140 Merge Case, 14 R.I.A.A. 236 (June 10, 1955) (Italian-U.S. Conciliation
Commission). This was a claim under Article 78 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy,
seeking compensation for the loss of personal property located in Italy and lost during
the war. The claimant was born in the United States in 1909, and thus acquired
American nationality by birth. She was issued a U.S. passport in 1931, and it was
renewed in 1933, for validity until March 16, 1935. In 1933, she married Savatore
Merge, an Italian national, and thus acquired Italian nationality by operation of law.
Her husband, an Italian government employee, was sent to the Italian Embassy in
Tokyo to work as a translator and interpreter in 1937. Mrs. Merge traveled with her
husband to Tokyo on what was apparently an Italian diplomatic passport, issued in
1937. On February 21, 1940, Ms. Merg6 registered herself as a U.S. national at the
American consulate in Tokyo.
After the end of World War II in Japan, Ms. Merge apparently refused to allow
American military authorities to return her to the United States and insisted on
remaining with her husband instead. She later returned to the United States on a one-
way passport in 1946, and remained there for nine months. She then had her passport
validated for travel to Italy and was admitted to Italy on a three-month visitors visa in
1947. Soon after arriving in Italy, she executed an affidavit with the American
consulate in Rome in order to explain her long absence from the United States. In
1950, she applied for and received a new U.S. passport, claiming a legal residence in
New York City and an intention to return to the United States at some time in the
future. She remained in Italy at least until the time the case was decided in 1955.
After canvassing a large body of potentially applicable law, the commission applied
the Nottebohm test and concluded that Ms. Merg6's dominant and effective
nationality was that of Italy.
4I See BROWNLIE 1990, supra note 19, at 411 ("There was very little on the
international plane which expressly denied the effective link doctrine, and the
incidental rejection of it in the Salem case was regarded by contemporaries as a
novelty.") (footnotes omitted).
142 See supra Part IV.B.1
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perhaps the most politically sensitive issue before the tribunal. Over a
vehement dissent by the Iranian arbitrator, Chamber Two of the Tribunal
followed the Notteboh/ilMerge line of cases in Esphananian v. Bank
Tejarat"' and Golpira v. Iran."M After Chamber Two issued its decisions,
143 Award No. 31-157-2 (29 March 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 157. In
Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, the claimant was a national of Iran under Iranian law
and of the United States under U.S. law. He held both an Iranian identity card and a
U.S. Naturalization Certificate (reading in part "former nationality Iran"). His
naturalization date was August 1, 1958. He worked in Iran for a U.S. company 9 out
of 12 months each year between 1970 and 1978, and in 1972 used his Iranian identity
card number to open a Rial-denominated checking account at Iranians' Bank. He left
Iran for the United States in 1978.
The claimant asserted that he should be able to qualify as either a U.S. national or an
Iranian national under the agreement. The bank, by contrast, asserted that because
Iranian law did not recognize dual nationality, Iran should not be presumed to have
accepted the possibility of claims by dual nationals when it signed the Claims
Settlement Declaration.
Chamber Two of the Tribunal rejected both of these arguments, holding instead that it
must rely on the principle of dominant and effective nationality. It reached this
conclusion-after examining other possible rules of international law-by relying
heavily on the reasoning of the Nottebohi and Merge cases. Applying the principle,
Chamber Two found the claimant to have the dominant and effective nationality of
the United States. In doing this, the chamber took special care to explain why the
claimant's regular use of an Iranian passport was not dispositive:
It should be noted that Iranian law permits renunciation of Iranian
nationality only with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Any
person who receives such approval is thereafter allowed to travel to Iran
only once, in order to sell or transfer his properties. With respect to
Esphahanian's use of an Iranian passport to enter and leave Iran, the
Tribunal notes that the laws of Iran in effect forced such use. Once
Esphahanian had emigrated to the United States and had become an
American citizen. the only way he could return lawfully to Iran was as
an Iranian national, using an Iranian passport. If he insisted on using his
U.S. passport to enter Iran, he would be turned away or, at least, his
U.S. passport would be confiscated and he would be admitted only as an
Iranian. In effect, Iran told its citizens that, if they took foreign
nationality, they must also retain their Iranian nationality-which in
Iran would be considered their sole nationality-or they would be
forever barred from returning to Iran. Esphahanian asserts that he used
his Iranian passport solely to enter and leave Iran, and a review of
copies of his various passports largely supports those assertions. With
the exception of one Lebanese and one Saudi Arabian visa, the visas
and immigration stamps of countries other than Iran are all in his
American passports.
On the basis of these facts, the Tribunal concludes that Esphahanian's
dominant and effective nationality at all relevant times has been that of
the United States, and the funds at issue in the present claim are related
primarily to his American nationality, not his Iranian nationality. With
the exceptions of his use of an Iranian passport to enter and leave Iran
and his nominal ownership of stock on behalf of his employer, all of his
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the Iranian government asked the Full Tribunal to consider whether the
claims of individuals who were nationals of Iran under Iranian law
should be ever admissible against Iran.'49 In Case No. A/18,' the Full
actions relevant to this claim could have been done by a non-Iranian.
The Tribunal holds that the Claimant, Nasser Esphahanian, is a national
of the United States within the meaning of the Claims Settlement
Declaration and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide his claim
against Bank Tejarat.
Id. at 167-68.
114 Award No. 32-211-2 (29 Mar. 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 171. Golpira v.
Iran was essentially a companion case to Esphahanian. The claimant was born in Iran
to an Iranian father, and was thus a national of Iran under Iranian law. He was issued
a numbered Iranian identity card. He received his primary, secondary, and college
education in Iran, and earned his medical degree there. At age 26, he left Iran for the
United states, where he completed his medical training. He began practicing
medicine in Baltimore, Maryland in 1958, and was still practicing in Baltimore at the
time the claim was filed. He became a permanent resident of the United States in
1957, and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1964. He received naturalization
certificate No. 8527559. Although it is not completely clear, the Tribunal seems to
have accepted this naturalization certificate-or evidence of its existence-as proof
that the claimant possessed U.S. nationality under U.S. law.
The claimant returned to Iran three times after 1964, each time for approximately two
weeks. In 1970, with the help of his father, the claimant purchased a number of shares
in an Iranian medical group. The stock certificates listed the claimant's Iranian
identity card number, but Iran admitted at the hearing that this stock could be owned
by foreign nationals.
Relying on the Nottebohni Case, the chamber looked for the claimant's dominant and
effective nationality. The chamber relied on the claimant's long residence in the
United States and the concentration of his professional life there to hold that the he
was a dominant and effective national of the United States.
145 The actual awards in Esphahanian and Golpira could not be affected by the
outcome of this decision, even if the Full Tribunal held that their reasoning was
incorrect. See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 78, art. IV, para. 1; Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal Rules, art. 32, para. 2.
46 Decision No. 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251. Case No.
A/18 is the most important case in the Tribunal's dual nationality jurisprudence. After
Chamber Two issued awards finding jurisdiction over dual nationals in the
Esphahanian and Golpira cases, the Iranian government asked the Full Tribunal to
consider whether the claims of individuals who were nationals of Iran under Iranian
law should ever be admissible against Iran. Iran argued that the Tribunal did not have
jurisdiction over claims against Iran by those who were Iranian nationals under
Iranian law, and that the fact that an individual was a U.S. national under U.S. law
should not create an exception to this rule. The United States, in contrast, argued that
the Tribunal had jurisdiction over claims against Iran by anyone who was a U.S.
citizen under U.S. law, irrespective of whether that person was also an Iranian citizen
under Iranian law.
The Full Tribunal rejected both of these contentions. It then examined the 1930
Hague Convention, see supra note 19, a number of arbitral and judicial decisions
dealing with the conflict of nationality laws, and legal literature relating to conflict of
nationality laws. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that Article 4 of the Hague
Convention, which asserts that "A state may not afford diplomatic protection to one
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Tribunal held that they were, explaining that "the relevant rule of
international law ... is the rule that flows from the dictum of Nottebohm,
the rule of real and effective nationality, and the search for 'stronger
factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose
nationality is involved.'""
2. Passports and Dual Nationality
Because current international law applies the dominant and
effective nationality test in situations of dual nationality, it is necessary to
take account of the test in applying the law of binding state action to the
nationality of passport holders. Under this test, an individual who is a
national of State A under State A domestic law and also a national of
State B under State B domestic law will be a national of one state but not
the other for purposes of international law. In this case, it would be
inconsistent with international nationality law to apply the law of binding
state action to the country of non-dominant nationality, if the internal
laws of that country do not recognize dual nationality.
of its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses," had been
supplanted by the rule of dominant and effective nationality. It noted:
Thus, the relevant rule of international law which the Tribunal may take
into account for purposes of interpretation, as directed by Article 31,
paragraph 3(c), of the Vienna Convention, is the rule that flows from
the dictum of Nottebohm, the rule of real and effective nationality, and
the search for "stronger factual ties between the person concerned and
one of the States whose nationality is involved." In view of the
pervasive effect of this rule since the Nottebohm decision, the Tribunal
concludes that the references to "national" and "nationals" in the
Algiers Declarations must be understood as consistent with that rule
unless an exception is clearly stated. As stated above, the Tribunal does
not find that the text of the Algiers Declarations provides such a clear
exception.
For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal holds that it has jurisdiction
over claims against Iran by dual Iran-United States nationals when the
dominant and effective nationality of the claimant during the relevant
period from the date the claim arose until 19 January 1981 was that of
the United States. In determining the dominant and effective
nationality, the Tribunal will consider all relevant factors, including
habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in public
life and other evidence of attachment.
To this conclusion the Tribunal adds an important caveat. In cases
where the Tribunal finds jurisdiction based upon a dominant and
effective nationality of the claimant, the other nationality may remain
relevant to the merits of the claim.
Id. at 265.
147 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 265 (internal citations omitted).
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For instance, assume an individual holds passports of both States A
and B, but is a dominant and effective national of State B. If the
individual were traveling in a third state, State C, State A would not be
able to assert diplomatic protection over State C's objection."
" If State A recognizes dual nationality, it is appropriate to
apply the law of binding state action. The passport holder's
possession of an additional nationality does not have any
effect on his or her continued possession of the nationality
of State A.
" If State A does not recognize dual nationality, its issuance
of a passport to the individual is an assertion not only that
it believes the individual to be a State A national, but that
it does not believe the individual to be a State B national
(or a national of any other state). In this case, an
individual holding a passport from another state no longer
fulfils one of the basic conditions of State A nationality-
that he not possess the nationality of any other state.
Therefore, if State A does not recognize dual or multiple
nationality, the law of binding state action should not be
applied to hold State A responsible for a person who is a
dominant and effective national of State B.
" It does not matter whether State B recognizes dual
nationality, because State B is the state of dominant and
effective nationality. It will always be prevented by the law
of binding state action from denying the nationality of one
of its dominant and effective nationals.
VII. INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
The substantive-law focus of the preceding sections would not be
complete without an examination of international procedure. In this
Part, I elaborate on three important procedural issues: standing, burden
of proof, and remedies.
A. Standing
Standing to bring a claim is perhaps the greatest obstacle to
denationalized individuals seeking redress. As discussed in Part II,
international tribunals have traditionally been open only to claims
brought by sovereign states. An individual wishing to recover for a
wrong committed by a state would need to arrange for the state of his or
her nationality to exercise diplomatic protection and present the claim on
the individual's behalf. Although this worked relatively well in claims
against foreign states, it presents obvious problems for the individual
148 See Nottebohrn Case, 1955 I.C.J. 4.
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wishing to recover against the state of his or her own nationality. The
logical solution would be for the individual to find another state to bring
the claim. Unfortunately, this is generally not possible, as most tribunals
permit states to exercise diplomatic protection only on behalf of their
nationals.' 9 However, there are important exceptions to this principle.I
' ll
Of course, states may contract around the default requirement of
nationality when establishing an international tribunal.'' To date, two
examples of contracting around this requirement are particularly
important. The first is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, which
permits parties to bring claims on the basis of ethnicity, in addition to
nationality.' The second is the United Nations Compensation
Commission, which has allowed certain international organizations to file
claims on behalf of "individuals who were not in a position to have their
claims filed by a Government."''
Moreover, in the past half-century, opportunities for individuals to
assert international claims without the sponsorship of a protecting state
have become increasingly frequent. The European Court of Human
Rights,' the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,"' and the
149 See BROWNLIE 1990, supra note 19, at 480 ("The other generally accepted
exceptions [to the principle that states may only exercise diplomatic protection on
behalf of their nationals] are alien seamen on ships flying the flag of the protecting
state and members of the armed forces of a state.").
150 Id.
151 Id. ("A right to protection of non-nationals may arise from treaty or ad hoc
arrangement establishing an agency.") (footnote omitted).
152 See supra note 26.
153 United Nations Compensation Commission, The Claims, http://www.unog.ch/
uncc/theclaims.htm ("The Commission has accepted for filing claims of individuals,
corporations and Governments, submitted by Governments, as well as those
submitted by international organizations for individuals who were not in a position to
have their claims filed by a Government."). See also John R. Crook, The United
Nations Compensation Comission-A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibilitt,
87 Am. J. INT'L L. 144, 149-150 (1993) ("Eligibility to bring a claim before the
Commission is not governed by the traditional principles of diplomatic protection and
espousal. States may present the claims of residents who are not nationals; even
stateless persons may have their claims brought before the Commission.").
154 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 34 ("The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.").
155 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, art.
23(1) ("In accordance with the provisions of Articles 44 to 51 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Regulations of the Commission shall determine
the procedure to be followed in cases of petitions or communications alleging
violation of any of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, and imputing such
violation to any State Party to the Convention.").
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Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal'" each have explicit provisions authorizing the
receipt of individual claims in at least some circumstances.
Still, there is a relative scarcity of international tribunals with both
(1) substantive jurisdiction over denationalization claims and (2)
procedural mechanisms for the receipt of a claim, by or on behalf of an
individual, against the state of his or her nationality. Yet, given current
trends toward recognition of individual claims, additional fora with both
of these attributes may develop in the foreseeable future.
B. Burden of Proof
The basic principles underlying the international law of nationality
thus create exceptions to the law of binding state action where fraud, loss
of nationality, or the dual nationality problem occurs. For two important
reasons, it is the burden of the issuing state to prove that any of these
exceptions may apply. First, it is generally accepted in international law
that passports constitute at least prima facie evidence of nationality.'
Second, it makes sense in terms of sound international policy to place
this burden on the issuing state.
In the context of the first two exceptions (fraud and loss of
nationality), the issuing state has custody of all documentary evidence
necessary to either prove or disprove the applicability of these
exceptions.' In the context of the third exception (dual nationality), the
issuing state may not have access to all documents necessary to prove
that the passport holder is in fact a dominant and effective national of
another state. However, it will be the only party with access to all
documents necessary to prove that the passport holder is its own
dominant and effective national. Thus, it would be unfair to place the
burden of proof on the passport holder, when access to documents
necessary to prove his or her case would depend completely on the whim
of the issuing state.
Without coercive authority over the issuing state, an international
tribunal is unable to force an uncooperative state to produce such
156 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 78, art. II(3) ("Claims of
nationals of the United States and Iran that are within the scope of this Agreement
shall be presented to the Tribunal either by claimants themselves or, in the case of
claims of less than $250,000, by the government of such national.").
157 See supra Part IVA.1.
158 See SANDIFER, supra note 74 (quoting G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (3d. ed. 1957)) ("Until evidence to the contrary is
produced, nationality must be presumed to be a continuous state of affairs. Thus, it is
not for the claimant to prove that, at any particular moment, the claimant has not lost
its nationality. This would mean to ask it to discharge an impossible burden of proof
and amount to probatio diabolica."); see also Case No. A118, Decision No. 32-A18-FT
(6 Apr. 1984), 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (dissent of Iranian arbitrators).
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documents. Moreover, even if the state does choose to produce
documents, the absence of coercive authority also prevents a tribunal
from punishing states that fail to comply fully (i.e., states that claim to
have produced necessary documents but somehow fail to include those
essential to establishing the passport holder's claim). Because of this
fundamental asymmetry in access to evidence, a decision to place the
burden of proof on the passport holder would effectively deny most of
these claims.
C. Remedy
It is true that this lack of coercive authority might make a tribunal
less willing to issue an order that a state treat a particular individual as its
national.' The issuance of such an order would simply give the state an
opportunity to "prove" by violating the order that the tribunal had no
real authority over such a "domestic" issue. Since international tribunals
may remain without extensive equitable authority for the foreseeable
future, a passport holder's right not to have his nationality "denied" by
the issuing state should instead be protected by what Calebresi and
Melamed have termed a "liability rule."'' A state may of course decide
that it will not treat a person as its national. However, if the state cannot
demonstrate one of the exceptions discussed above, it should be held
liable for compensation to that individual." '
159 Although many international tribunals are constituted by agreement on the
part of both states to obey the tribunal's orders, it does not seem unreasonable to
assume that nationality is such a sensitive issue that many states would not be willing
to allow an international tribunal to order it to treat someone as its national.
160 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Propert Rules. Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)
Although this proposal may be jarring to those who believe that nationality fits more
appropriately into the "inalienability" category, the proposal to protect nationality by
a liability rule comes out of a recognition of the limited authority of international
tribunals-in the case of claimants whose nationality has been "denied," it is most
likely compensation or nothing. See id. at 1092-93. Of course, a state would always
have the option to credit an international tribunal's determination of wrongful
denationalization and re-admit the individual to its nationality. This would mitigate. if
not eliminate, financial liability on the part of the passport-issuing state (although
substantial liability could still remain for other illicit acts, such as expropriation of
property while the individual was being treated as an alien).
161 At least one scholar has argued that monetary remedies are not appropriate for
many human rights violations. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 305 (1999) ("Monetary compensation that tolerates the wrong
and allows the perpetrator to buy injustice is not appropriate where inalienable rights
are concerned."). However, this argument seems to overlook the likelihood that in
the international context, an unrealistic insistence on equitable remedies may in fact
be more likely to lead to non-enforcement of the rights in question.
As this Article focuses on the liability phase of a denationalization claim, the
appropriate amount of any monetary compensation is outside the scope of this
2004]
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Although some states might also refuse a tribunal's order to pay
compensation to an illegally denationalized individual, there are several
reasons for believing that this would not always be the case. First, in at
least one circumstance, the establishment of an international tribunal has
been accompanied by an agreement that a certain amount of money be
set aside in escrow to pay any judgments that might later become due.'62
Second, it is much easier politically for a country to obey an order to pay
financial compensation than an order to re-admit an undesired individual
to all of the rights and privileges of its nationality. Third, money
judgments against a state can potentially be enforced against assets of
that state located in other countries. Fourth, money judgments against a
state can become part of its general debt, to be paid later on-after
political interest in a case has subsided, or after a new administration,
eager to atone for past wrongs, comes into power.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The last fifteen years have seen substantial shifts in state control
over territory. Significant examples include the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the independence of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, the
division of Czechoslovakia, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, the reversion of Hong Kong to China, the
secession of East Timor from Indonesia, and the U.S.-led occupation of
Iraq. Unlike many aspects of world politics, however, these changes can
directly affect the legal status of individuals. Although this effect is
sometimes a "simple" change in nationality, at other times it leaves
individuals with a choice of multiple nationalities or even with no
nationality at all.
For our purposes, it is worth recognizing that changes in territorial
sovereignty can lead to large-scale denationalization in two major ways.
The first, denationalization by operation of law, occurs when nationality
laws adopted by predecessor or successor states operate in such a way as
to leave a particular group of individuals stateless, even though those
very individuals were previously citizens of a predecessor state. This
phenomenon is widely recognized as a problem, and was most recently
analysis. On valuation of international claims in the related area of wrongful
expulsion of aliens, see WHITEMAN, supra note 15, at 419-427. It is worth
emphasizing, however, that while wrongful expulsion claims might be useful
precedent in determining appropriate compensation for property lost through
expulsion-related aspects of a denationalization claim, they would be less relevant to
determining appropriate compensation for the wrongful deprivation of the rights and
privileges of nationality.
162 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 78.
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addressed in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States.63
The second, discriminatory denationalization, can occur when
changes in territorial sovereignty result in groups of individuals finding
that they have suddenly become part of a politically unpopular minority.
Political and economic pressure or military conflict can then lead the
government in power to denationalize that minority, justifying this action
on the idea that those individuals should never have been made nationals
in the first place." The risk of discriminatory denationalization may be
particularly high when persons from a former colonial power become a
minority in a newly-independent successor state,'"' or when the new
minority group is overrepresented in government or important sectors of
the economy."
163 See Chapter IV: Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States, in Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-first Session, U.N. Doc. A/
54/10 (1999).
1"- Such denationalizations can occur in either a predecessor or a successor state.
165 For example, manv ethnic Russians chose to remain in the Baltic states after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Lithuania granted citizenship to all who
had been living within its borders in 1989, Estonia and Latvia instituted strict
citizenship requirements for those who could not trace their heritage back to someone
living in the country prior to 1940 (the time of the Soviet occupation). Baltic s Thet
and us, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1993, at 67. One paper published by the Estonian
government in 1993 is particularly revealing. It noted:
Some non-citizens, especially Russians, may find it difficult to get used
to the fact that their role has changed from that of representatives of the
majority population of a colonial empire to that of a minority in a
foreign country. It is understandable that complicated citizenship or
human rights problems may develop from this.
Id. (quoting Estonian government paper). Given that, in 1991, ethnic Russians made
up nearly a third of the Estonian population and a third of the Latvian population, it
is not difficult to imagine either of these governments facing political pressure to
expel ethnic Russians. In a worst-case scenario, this could conceivable include
denationalization of even those ethnic Russians who had satisfied the strict citizenship
requirements (and thus held passports). See also Unique Culture of the city of Narva,
Estonia (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 6, 2003) (noting that many ethnic
Russians in Estonia are still officially stateless); Andy Bowers & Linda Wertheimer,
Latvia's Russian Population (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 20, 1998) (noting
tensions between Latvians and ethnic Russians): Estonia. Honored eutein,
ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 46 (suggesting a danger of secession by ethnic Russians in
parts of Estonia where they constitute a majority).
166 See, e.g., THE HORN OF AFRICA WAR, supra note 3, at 14 (identifying "[plublic
resentment over the role of people of Eritrean origin in business and government" as
one possible cause of Ethiopia's decision to begin expelling ethnic Eritreans). On
market-dominant minorities more generally, see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democrac,
and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1
(1998).
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In the case of denationalization by operation of law, I have argued
that the law of binding state action provides certain guarantees to
passport holders and other states. Specifically, any individual who holds
a passport from a predecessor state should have a right to retain the
nationality of that state if the state in question continues to exist. If the
passport-issuing state ceases to exist, the state that succeeds to its rights
and obligations should be bound to accept the passport holder as its
national."'
In the case of discriminatory denationalization, the law of binding
state action may help to prevent its occurrence. By holding a state
responsible for assertions of nationality in its passports, this body of law
makes it much more difficult for a passport-issuing state to expel
passport holders on the pretext that they are not citizens. At the very
least, this body of law requires a state to take formal action (1) to
attempt to recall the individual passports in question; and (2) to formally
notify other states that those particular passports are no longer valid.' "
The tendency of some states to conduct ethnically-based expulsions
informally, with little process or procedural protection,"' suggests that a
requirement of formal notice to other states might serve as a disincentive
to such denationalization.""
Of course, the law of binding state action can eliminate neither
statelessness nor discriminatory denationalization. However, a proper
understanding of its applicability to passport holders provides a basis in
"hard" public international law for what many people believe to be an
important constraint on state behavior. Admittedly, passport holders are
not the only individuals who need this type of protection, and an
argument could be made that those wealthy enough to afford
international travel (and thus possess passports) are in fact the least
likely to need protection from denationalization and expulsion.
Nonetheless, up to this point human rights law has not been
effective in protecting individuals from arbitrary or unfair
denationalization. There is a substantial amount of soft law on point, but
this soft law has not prevented states from denationalizing their citizens.
167 It is worth emphasizing that this would probably not result in a requirement
that the successor state grant nationality to all nationals of its predecessor, because
only a portion of the state's population is likely to hold a passport.
16s Because other states cannot be expected to make judgments as to ethnicity at
the border, this would require that the passport- issuing state identify recalled
passports by name and passport number. It would not be sufficient to send out a
general notification that "all persons of ethnicity X are no longer citizens of State Y."
169 See. e.g., ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 3 ("Snatched off the street, dragged from
their homes, or picked up from their workplaces, 'Haitian -looking' people are rarely
given a reasonable opportunity to challenge their expulsion.").
170 Again, it is worth noting that passport holders will likely be only a small
percentage of those subjected to discriminatory denationalization measures.
[Vol. 10:301
2004] Passports and Nationality in International Law 355
With the addition of the hard law of binding state action, one small step
can be made toward limiting state action in particular factual situations.
Considering the general vulnerability of denationalized individuals to
other abuses, even such a small step seems to be a significant movement
in the right direction.

